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Counter-Intelligence in a Command Economy
counter-intelligence. The agencies of the state that are assignedspecial competence in the sphere of struggle with the intelligenceagencies of other states and the disruptive activities of theorganizations and persons that they exploit. C[ounter-intelligence] isone of the instruments of the state’s political power (Nikitchenko1972, p. 142).
IntroductionOur ambitious goal is to describe the role of counter-intelligence in acommand economy – that of the postwar Soviet Union. This topic does notappear in the chapter headings or indexes of textbooks on the Sovieteconomy or economies of that type, their economic history anddevelopment, or comparative economic systems.1 It is absent from thenumerous essays published by the United States Joint EconomicCommittee (1976, 1979, 1982, 1987) in periodic collections on the Sovieteconomy. Nor is it mentioned in the only readable, entertaining, andotherwise highly accurate novel ever written in English about the Sovieteconomic system (Spufford 2010).Of course, such accounts often show awareness that the securityagencies existed by making reference to their role in periodic massarrests, forced migration and settlement, the use of detainees for forcedlabour, the repression of particular economists and statisticians, secrecy,and so forth. Not unrepresentative, however, are the late Alec Nove’s(1961, p. 98) remarks on the significance of the security police andprosecution service for “inspection and control”:Nothing needs to be said about them in the present context, despitetheir importance in Soviet life.And then, in a footnote:
1 For example Allen (2003); Brus (1986); Campbell (1966); Davies,Harrison, and Wheatcroft (1994); Dobb (1948); Eatwell, Milgate, andNewman (1987); Ellman (1989); Gregory, and Stuart (1985); GregoryandHarrison (2005); Hanson (2003); Hunter and Szyrmer (1992); Jasny(1961); Kaser (1970); Kornai (1980, 1992); Millar (1981); Munting(1982); Nove (1961, 1969, 1977); Rutland (1985); Schwartz (1968);Spulber (1964); Wilber (1969); Wilczynski (1970); Zaleski (1971, 1980).
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Large Soviet enterprises possessed, and probably still possess, a“secret department” staffed by secret police, which organized anetwork of informers. However, they were more likely to be roused bya disrespectful remark about Stalin than by, say, the overspending ofthe wage fund.Something is missing, perhaps: what was the systematic influence ofthe agency responsible for state security on the overall allocation ofresources? The omission is understandable, given that until recently theexercise of this function was entirely secret. Now that it is no longersecret, we aim to shed light on it.An element may have been missing from the picture, yet the omissionmight turn out to be insignificant. Has past neglect of the counter-intelligence function of the Soviet “organs” of state security (the KGB andits predecessors) had any practical consequences? What, if anything, waslost from our understanding as a result? We will use the evidence to showtwo things.First, we will find that the main function of counter-intelligence was toenforce security procedures throughout the Soviet economy, and thisconstituted a regulatory burden on the planned economy and commandsystem. The economic literature on regulation in market economies tendsto focus on the benefits to consumers from limiting market power andenforcing transparency and non-discrimination. Such benefits must thenbe balanced against the costs – the regulatory burden (e.g. Viscusi,Vernon, and Harrington 2005, p. 9). In the KGB we will find a regulator ofa different kind. The KGB served a political master, not the consumer. Itsjob was to enforce secrecy, monopoly, and discrimination. In addition,there was a regulatory burden. These are new topics for comparativeeconomics and economic history (but see Harrison 2013a, 2013b).A second implication of our paper is that in future, when we writedown the goals of the Soviet rulers for the economy, we should give moreprominence to internal security. In this sense our study complementsrecent work by Vladimir Kontorovich and others (Kontorovich and Wein2009; Harrison 2013c) that aims to rectify past neglect of externalsecurity as a goal of the Soviet-type command economy.The paper’s evidence base is primarily documentation held in theLithuania Special Archive of the KGB and also (on microfilm) at theHoover Institution, California. This evidence has been available only sinceLithuania gained independence and established control over the recordsof the KGB units that operated on its territory. We have also surveyed the
3
secondary literature contributed by Lithuanian historians on the KGB inthe system of Soviet rule.2The primary records that we use are from the period after 1953. Untilthen Lithuania was in a state of insurgency and the chief task of counter-intelligence was to prevent the armed overthrow of Soviet rule. After1953, the state of affairs in Lithuania was normalized (by Sovietstandards), and the functions of counter-intelligence in Lithuania alsobecame “normal.”While the evidence base of the paper pertains to Lithuania, and manyLithuanians considered themselves to be in a state of colonial subjugation,the story in the evidence is not about colonial rule. It is about the workingarrangements of Soviet rule in general. When the KGB responded tocircumstances in Lithuania, it responded in the same way that it dideverywhere, including in Russia.In this paper we focus to a large extent on the 1960s. By that time thetransition from Stalinist terror to the softer authoritarianism of laterSoviet rule was complete. In other respects the sixties were a time ofcontinuing political and economic transition. In politics the often chaoticregime of Nikita Khrushchev gave way to the relative order of LeonidBrezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin. In the domestic economy a “treadmill of‘reforms’” was already revolving (the phrase was coined by Schroeder1979). Experiments in the withdrawal of food subsidies allowed prices torise, triggering a scarring confrontation between the workers’ state andthe factory workers (Baron 2001; this is a central episode in the story ofSpufford 2009). A regional devolution of industrial planning wascancelled, bringing the industrial ministries back under Moscow’s control,but there were also measures to promote the independence of factorymanagers from ministerial oversight (Kontorovich 1988).The outside world provided essential context for these developments.Across Europe the sixties saw related trends affecting young people inparticular: they joined higher education in unprecedented numbers, andthere was a flowering of youth culture, felt as strongly and with equaltrepidation in East and West. Meanwhile, new models of communismwere being promoted abroad, in China and Czechoslovakia.The paper is organized as follows. A first section considers thesignificance of Lithuanian records for understanding the Soviet system ofrule. The second section considers the preventive tasks and organizationof KGB counter-intelligence in Lithuania. The third section describes the
2 Anušauskas (1998, 2003, 2008); Burinskaitė (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008, 2009); Grybkauskas (2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011);
Juodis (2009); Okuličiūtė (2006, 2007); Rahi-Tamm, Jansons, and Kaasik (2010); Streikus (2004); Tannberg (2010).
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sphere of responsibility of the KGB department specifically responsiblefor counter-intelligence in the economy. Further sections describe theactivities and results of the agent network, the KGB’s role in managementselection and promotion, and its interventions in economic emergencies.After that, we turn to KGB counter-intelligence as a channel of opinionand analysis to the authorities concerning the security impact ofeconomic policies and policy reforms and we ask whether this gave theKGB privileged access to the making of policy. The final section concludes.
1. Lithuania: Soviet rule or colonial ruleWhile KGB archives in Russia remain closed for historical research,evidence from Lithuania and other newly independent states can providea keyhole through which to peer into the Soviet past. Although fascinatingin its own right, a keyhole is not unrestricted access. How far can wegeneralize from what is seen through the keyhole? Soviet Lithuania was aborderland and in some respects a colony. Does the keyhole show usSoviet rule, colonial rule, or the tyranny of distance?The subjugation of Lithuania to Soviet rule took place in two phases.In the first phase, from 1940 to 1953, Lithuania fell under alternatingSoviet and German military occupations. Lithuanian society was divided.Armies and militarized security forces battled each other and armedinsurgents.3 This was different from Russia’s revolution and civil war, butnot that different: communist rule in Russia also required a civil war,which was fought in two stages, from 1918 to 1920 for control of thetowns and borders, and from 1929 to 1934 for control of the countryside.From 1954 Lithuania entered a longer phase of civil peace. In thepeaceful phase officials of the Lithuania KGB maintained a clear sense oftheir specific environment, based on Lithuania’s location and history.4Bordering the Baltic Sea and Poland (Figure 1), Lithuania was astrategic front line of the Cold War. With a distinctive history, culture, andlanguage, Lithuania was of relatively recent incorporation into the SovietUnion (in substance Lithuania was incorporated twice, once in 1940 and asecond time in 1944). While the KGB’s internal language was alwaysRussian, it could not rule Lithuania without quickly recruiting Lithuaniansand others familiar with the language and alphabet. But first among thecomplicating factors that arose was the Lithuanians’ living memory ofnational independence and statehood under “bourgeois Lithuania.” Other
3 For vivid description see Reklaitis (2007), Statiev (2010); Weinerand Rahi-Tamm (2012).
4 Burinskaitė (2011, pp. 25-26).
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factors included a large Lithuanian diaspora and close familycommunications among residents and emigrants, the presence of former“state criminals” (the leaders of pre-Soviet Lithuania and the Lithuanianinsurgency) who had survived and returned from imprisonment ordeportation, and the activities of the Roman Catholic Church. Keenawareness of all these factors is shown in numerous status reports of thelocal KGB counter-intelligence.One of many such reports is that of 31 January 1966. It lists thesecurity risks specific to Lithuania: Its strategic location, the deploymentof nuclear weapons (military facilities “of special importance”) on itsterritory, the presence of important industrial and scientific facilities, thebarely-suppressed memory of a free and independent Lithuania, theexistence of a large nationalist emigration in Western Europe and NorthAmerica, and increasing correspondence and direct contact throughtourism between Lithuanians and foreigners, many with past family ties. 5The report provides some measures. It gives the number of peoplemaintaining correspondence with relatives abroad as 430,000 (one inseven of a 3-million population). There are 12,000 citizens claimingGerman ethnicity. The number “returning to the republic” (i.e. freed fromimprisonment and exile to distant provinces after the death of Stalin) isgiven as 20,000, including 8,179 formerly active nationalists and pro-German collaborators, of whom 784 remain under surveillance. Alsounder current surveillance are 132 “former agents” of the imperialistpowers.While some security risks (such as the presence of members of theprewar generation) could be expected to diminish over time, othersappeared to grow inexorably. In Table 1, we report figures on Lithuania’scontacts with the West. Outward travel was severely restricted butgrowing rapidly. Visitors to the republic exceeded outgoing travellers by alarge (though falling) multiple. By modern standards Lithuania wasextraordinarily isolated; in 2011 Lithuania received more than onemillion visitors from the European Union countries.6 Still, young peoplewere always particularly interested in travel, adventure, new fashions,and new ideas, and there were always more young people.
5 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/644, 1-22 (Spravka. From: Nachal’nik 2upravlaniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR polkovnik Obukauskas. Date: 5Januar 1966).
6 Reported in Vakarų ekspresas, 29 June 2012, athttp://www.ve.lt/naujienos/ekonomika/ekonomikos-naujienos/uzsienieciai-pernai-lietuvoje-keliavo-daugiau-768088/(accessed 10 September 2013).
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To what extent does Soviet rule in Lithuania represent Soviet rule ingeneral? If distinctive risks made for distinctive methods of rule, thenSoviet rule in Lithuania might have been “otherwise different.” WereLithuanians regarded as unreliable to the point that they were ruled insome special colonial way that did not apply elsewhere?If there was a clearly colonial element in Soviet rule, it was initially atthe expense of access to power of members of the local population.7Figure 2 is based on a collation of data currently available on theproportions of local nationals in the Baltic KGBs compared with theirproportions in the local populations. The figure shows the evolution of thelocal “nationality gap”: the shortfall in the shares of local nationals in theBaltic KGB workforces compared with their shares in the residentpopulations. In Estonia and Latvia in 1953, at the end of armed resistanceto Soviet rule, the gap was very large. In fact, KGB composition wasmainly Russian. Simple mechanisms ensured this outcome. Regardless oftheir nationality and residence, KGB officers had to be party members;they could not have remained on occupied territory during World War II,and could not be closely related to emigrants or armed resisters to Sovietrule. In the Baltic region this automatically restricted the securityservice’s local recruitment to a small pool.Time passed, and the significance of the war and postwar insurgencyshould have receded. A reasonable test of the colonial status of the Balticrepublics would be whether ethnic discrimination in KGB membershippersisted long after the war. Figure 2 suggests convergence in both Latviaand Lithuania. In Latvia, where the proportion of resident Russians washigh, the local nationals’ share in KGB personnel converged rapidly totheir share in the resident population. Convergence went more slowly inmore homogenous Lithuania. Even in Lithuania, however, by the 1980sthe gap was down to 5 percentage points. In this dimension, therefore,there was assimilation. Other dimensions might show different results,but this is the dimension that matters for present purposes.Lithuania presented a number of heightened risks that Soviet ruleaddressed by various means, but the toolkit from which the KGB chose itsinstruments seems to have been no different from those prescribedelsewhere – in Ukraine, for example, or even in Russia. Everywhere,Soviet rule worked to a single template with little or no attempt attailoring to local sensibilities: registration of the population; control ofemployment, promotion, travel and association; capture or suppression ofall organizations and means of communication; mass surveillance and
7 On the evolving role of the Russian second party secretary in Sovietrule in Lithuania see Grybkauskas (2010, 2013).
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continual monitoring of all the environments where people gathered tolive, work, learn, and play; minimal or zero tolerance of deviations frompolitical and social norms; and above all recruitment of localcollaborators. The lack of adaptation and sophistication was anadvantage; the template could be applied anywhere by people who couldbe trained for the purpose without being highly educated orcosmopolitan, and this is how it was applied across Central and EasternEurope after World War II (Applebaum 2012).If the template of Soviet rule worked anywhere, it workedeverywhere. Sent to Kiev in 1970 to take over the Ukrainian KGB, VitaliiFedorchuk contemptuously dismissed the idea of doing things the localway: “We work for the entire Union. There is no such thing as Ukraine inour work.”8 To such people, there was no such thing as Lithuania either.Much of the value of the records of Soviet rule in Lithuania lies, therefore,in what they can tell us about “the entire Union.”
2. Counter-intelligence: Ends and meansIn this section we discuss the ends and means of Soviet counter-intelligence, and the performance indicators used for self-evaluation.
2.1. PurposesIn continuity with its predecessors (from the Cheka of 1918 through theOGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MVD, and MGB), the KGB was the “shield and sword”of the Soviet state and communist party. How did this translate intomeasurable objectives for counter-intelligence? How did the KGB knowwhen it was doing a good job, or when it was falling short? In a plannedeconomy, everyone else had clear success indicators; why not the KGB?How did the KGB measure its own success? One might expect to learn thisfrom KGB internal documents, yet this turns out to be quite a problem.The measure of success in counter-intelligence cannot have beencatching spies, for few spies were caught. As the Lithuania KGB’s ColonelJuozas Obukauskas noted (in 1968):“Since 1958 we have not identified any cases of the undercoverplacement of hostile agents on the territory of the republic.”9But if the Soviet definition of counter-intelligence started with spy-catching, it went far beyond. “In socialist states,” wrote the authors of theKGB’s counterintelligence dictionary (Nikitchenko et al 1972, p. 143):
8 Quoted by Weiner and Rahi-Tamm (2012, p. 7).
9 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/663, 62 (Doklad, no date)
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the functions of counter-intelligence are determined by the interestsof the working people and are aimed at their defence from the
disruptive activities of the intelligence agencies of capitalist states andthe organizations and persons they employ (emphasis added).The idea that enemy intelligence was engaged not only in intelligencegathering but also in ideological, political, and economic disruption hadmajor implications. It meant a battle ground that extended from the secretcore of the Soviet state but extended outwards to the hearts and minds ofquite ordinary people. It also meant that the KGB had to look intoeverything and everyone. No one was so distant from the centre of powerthat the enemy might not use them to bring about disruption. No incidentthat disrupted the ordered flow of a planned economy and society was sotrivial that the influence of the enemy might not be at work. It was thetask of KGB surveillance to watch out for “processes that are essentiallyanomalous, that is, incorrect, deviating from the general rule of processesand phenomena,” for anything that was “anomalous, that is, incorrect,”could signal the presence of the enemy. 10The idea that the job of the KGB was to detect and suppress abnormalpatterns of activity went back to the early 1930s, before the Great Terror,when Genrykh Iagoda headed the OGPU. According to Shearer (2009, p.124-126, 130-133, 159-161), Iagoda was the first proponent ofpreventive policing. Early intervention rested on the promptidentification of abnormal signals. But what was normal? This could bedetermined only by systematic surveillance and high-frequency reporting.The continual aggregation of all signals of activity in every city or regionwould establish the normal or background level of political noise acrossthe country. Only against this background could abnormalities bedetected.Possibly the KGB suffered from the goal indeterminacy that afflicts allpublic organizations with a preventive commission: How do you knowyou’ve prevented something that hasn’t happened yet? How do you knowyou’ve done enough? And how do you justify the resources you have?
10 The words quoted are from Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 14-23(Spravka o zadachakh operativnogo sostava 3 otdela 2 Upravleniia KGBpri SM Litovskoi SSR po uluchsheniiu kontrrazvedyvatel’noi raboty naobsluzhivaemykh ob”ektakh. From: Nachal’nik 2 otdeleniia 3 otdela 2upravleniia KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik Matulionis.Date: 24 April 1968).
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2.2. Resources and structureWhat resources did the Lithuania KGB deploy for these tasks? Table 2shows that throughout the 1960s the KGB employed fewer than 1,200officers, servicemen, and civilian employees. (This was in a country with apopulation around 3 million at that time.)The number of KGB operatives Vilnius formally tasked with counter-intelligence was smaller still; in the 1960s they were never more than140. In Table 2 they can be found under the second administration and,from 1967, the fifth department. This brings us to the organizationalstructure of the Lithuania KGB, which had many complicated details thatevolved over time and are not always easy to pin down. Figure 3 reportswhat is salient for KGB counter-intelligence in our time and place.(Appendix Figure A-1 puts this in the context of other KGB functions, butthe result is not completely consistent with what we know.)To summarize and also elaborate, at the beginning of the 1960scounter-intelligence was the remit of the KGB second administration.Until the 1967 reorganization the second administration had fourdepartments. According to a document of January 1966, just before thereorganization, the four departments employed 134 operative staff.11 The
first department (41 operatives in three divisions) was responsible forcountering the work of foreign intelligence agencies and those suspectedof links with them, including foreign diplomats, reporters, tourists, andother citizens. It also covered work in border zones and in theneighbourhood of military facilities of “special importance” (this meantnuclear weapons).The second department (47 operatives in three divisions) wasresponsible for exposure and suppression of anti-Soviet activities ofnationalist and other hostile groupings among the former leaders of“bourgeois Lithuania,” former insurgents, the Catholic Church, andintellectuals and young people. As Figure 2 shows, in September 1967following a national initiative the second department was reorganized asan independent fifth department responsible for containing ideologicaldisruption. Although no longer subordinate to the second administration,this was still counter-intelligence as before, but under another name.The third department (26 operatives in two divisions) wasresponsible for work on the railways and air transport, importantindustrial facilities, research institutes, and civil defence organizations. It
11 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/644, 39-47 (Spravka o 2-om Upravlenii KGB priSovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR. From: Nachal’nik 2 upravleniia KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR polkovnikObukauskas. Date: 31 January 1966).
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also regulated the regime of secrecy; it gave or refused clearance foraccess to classified documents and employments, and it supervisedforeigners when they were visiting economic facilities. The thirddepartment is at the focus of interest where the economy is concerned.The fourth department (18 operatives) was responsible forpenetrating hostile agencies and networks and disrupting the activity ofcircles linked with the nationalist emigration and the church. It was alsosupposed to investigate security leaks and propose measures to improvesecurity.The KGB was an élite organization, but this reflects the quality of itsorganization and training more than its talent pool. There was a strongemphasis on training and many officers had been through the KGB higherschool in Moscow. Table 5 shows that most third department officers(responsible for the supervision of industry and transport) had collegedegrees, and all had experience of secondary schooling. This comparesfavourably with the wider Lithuanian workforce, less than half of whomhad either higher or secondary experience according to the 1970 censusonly a few years before (TsSU 1972, p. 594).In other respects KGB personnel often appear to have been fairlyordinary. No one should confuse them with Smiley’s People. On theevidence of the written record, they did not do wit, irony, or literary orhistorical allusion. They showed no interest in sociological ideas or datacollection and analysis. They showed human frailties. In 1966, forexample, 19 employees were disciplined for negligence or amoralbehaviour, and 21 in 1967; the equivalent figures counting officers onlywere 13 and 16. According to the official summary, a common feature ofsuch cases was the abuse of alcohol, compounded by poor leadership andtraining.12 A few years later, in a case of great national importance thatshowed little prospect of a local result, there were clear signs of shirkingin the ranks (Harrison 2009).The small number of KGB career operatives may be surprising, butshould not be. The KGB was a core element of the system of power, bothas a channel of information and as an instrument of unlimited power. Alarge KGB could have threatened the personal authority of the SovietUnion’s rulers. From Stalin’s time, Soviet rulers knew the value of keepingsuch organizations small and close, with a tight rein on budgets andpersonnel (e.g. Belova and Gregory 2002; Gregory 2009).Even so, the true scale of resources available for counter-intelligencewas much larger than these limited numbers would imply. As Table 2shows, nearly 800 employees worked in the KGB’s fourth (surveillance)
12 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/663, 31-33 (Doklad, no date).
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administration, its investigative department (which did the police work),its operational-technical department (which opened letters, tappedphones, and planted bugs), and its local departments in the municipalitiesand rural districts. All of these were available to support the secondadministration in its counter-intelligence roles.To these numbers should be added the KGB’s network of undercoveragents and trusted persons. As reported in Table 3, there were more than5,000 of these at the start of the sixties and more than twice that numbera decade later. Most agents were affiliated with the KGB secondadministration (and later the fifth department) or with local KGBadministrations; their affiliations are also described in Table 3.One resource not listed in Tables 2 or 3 is the small numbers (between8 and 10 throughout the 1960s and 1970s) of supernumerary operatives(vneshtatnye operativnye sotrudniki), usually officers of the KGB andSoviet Army reserves, that the KGB placed in the secure facilities that itsupervised. 13 As described by Nikitchenko et al. (1972, p. 55), their rolewas to coordinate the agent network, enforce the regime of secrecy, assistwith surveillance and interventions, and so on.Table 4 puts KGB resources in Soviet Lithuania around 1970 inperspective. Lithuania’s 12,000 officers and informers amounted to justunder 4 per thousand of the resident population. The table offers twocomparators, the Soviet Union in the mid-thirties and East Germany justbefore the collapse of the Berlin wall. Lithuania’s modest figure is stillslightly more than the 3 per thousand found for the Soviet Union in the1930s. Both figures fall far below the Stasi’s 17-per-thousand saturationof East German society in its final year.We will see that the KGB economized on its scarce resources, not byspreading them evenly across a relatively dispersed and often ruralpopulation, but by concentrating on focal points such as secure facilities
13 Ten in 1964/65 based on LYA, K-41/1/644, 97-105 (Spravka orabote 3-go Otdela 2-ogo Upravlenii pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR vobsluzhyvaemykh objektakh. From: Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2 upravleniiaKomiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR polkovnikSudzilovskii. Date: 31 January 1966); 8 in 1971 from LYA, K-41/1/688,147-154 (Spravka o rabote vneshtatnykh sotrudnikov KGB pri SoveteMinistrov Litovskoi SSR. From: Nachal’nik 2 upravleniia KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR polkovnik Naras.Date: 19 April, 1971); 9 in 1979 from LYA, K-41/1/755, p. 138a-148(Spravka o rabote 3-go Otdela 2-ogo Upravlenii pri Sovete MinistrovLitovskoi SSR. From: Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR polkovnikGrishechkin. Date: 10 February 1979). Published as “KGB slaptiejiarchyvai 1954-1991 m. Vilnius, 2011.
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of industry and transport, colleges, research institutes, and other offices.With that allocation, 3 or 4 per thousand was evidently enough to keepSoviet society mostly quiet for most of the time. “Most of the time” maynot have been good enough in the long run, but even the Stasi could nothold down East Germany forever.
2.3. EffectivenessThe first priority of the KGB was to prevent economic and politicaldisruption. How to translate this into success indicators was far fromclear. What were the units in which you could measure the KGB’s“output”?One might look for performance indicators in the regular KGB plansand reports of work done that were drawn up once or twice year. Thegeneral sense of these documents was to set out security risks and themeasures taken to manage them. Security risks were measured by figuressuch as the number of former state criminals at large, the scale of contactswith foreigners, the activities of suspect organizations (including theCatholic Church), and the frequency of anti-Soviet manifestations ofvarious kinds. The measures that managed them were the securityresources (such as agent networks) deployed and the activities (such asoperations and organizational measures) undertaken to counter them.Generally missing was the next logical step, that of evaluation. While thequality of KGB inputs and immediate results of KGB activities wereregularly reviewed in annual plans and reports of work, there was little orno evaluation of their impact on the security situation, that is to say, theirproductivity.What else might have served as a success indicator for counter-intelligence? Another way to think about this is suggested by higher-frequency status reports that itemized developments over previous daysor weeks in a purely factual way under two headings: “events”(proiavleniia) and “alerts” (signaly).14 The alerts were reports from
14 Several such lists appear in the files following the Kaunasdisturbances of 1972. Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/793, 103-104 (Svodkaoperativnoi informatsii za 20 maia 1972 g. From: Nachal’nikinformatsionno-analiticheskogo otdeleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR –maior E.K.Andriatis. Date: 21 May 1972); 105-106 (Svodka operativnoiinformatsii za 21 maia 1972 g. From: Nachal’nik informatsionno-analiticheskogo otdeleniia KGB pri SM Lit. SSR – maior E.Andriatis. Date:22 May 1972); 107-110 (Svodka operativnoi informatsii za 22 maia 1972g. From: Nachal’nik informatsionno-analiticheskogo otdeleniia KGB priSM Lit SSR – maior E.K.Andriatis. Date: 23 May 1972); 111-113(Operativnaia svodka za 23 maia 1972 goda. From: Nachal’nik
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agents, trusted persons, and others concerning anti-Soviet or subversiveattitudes or behaviours they had witnessed. The events represented thetranslation of these attitudes and behaviours into action: for example, thedestruction of Soviet flags or insignia or their replacement by those of“bourgeois” (i.e. independent) Lithuania; abuse of Soviet officials orcommunists or attacks on them; the painting of hostile slogans, thedistribution of anti-Soviet literature, and so forth.KGB officials clearly valued useful alerts; we will see that lack of alertsor their lack of content was a regular topic for complaints. On the otherhand, events were direct evidence of disruption; they occurred whencounter-intelligence had failed. From such documents one could infer asuccess indicator for the KGB: ௔௟௘௥௧௦
௘௩௘௡௧௦
. The higher the ratio, the moreeffective and more necessary was the KGB’s role in gathering signals ofthe disruptive activity of foreign intelligence (in the numerator of theratio) and suppressing their consequences (in the denominator). There isno evidence, however, that anyone in the KGB gathered data on trends inthis sensitive ratio or used it for relative performance evaluation.Like most organizations with elusive output, the KGB seems to havefallen back on measures of activity or case-load. As Table 6 shows, datawere reported from time to time through the 1960s on a few suchmeasures: verified alerts, cases (and persons) under investigation, andpersons prosecuted. The numbers do not support an image of informationchannels crowded with signals and vigilant officers worn out by heavycase loads. In the latter sixties, as the dissident movement got under wayacross the country, the average officer of the Lithuania KGB was having todeal with a couple of signals during the year and was faced with perhapsone investigation. Prosecutions per officer were trivially low. In thecourse of a year only one in four agents and trusted persons wasproviding an alert that turned out to have operational content. Where thechange in case load indicators over time is known, they were falling.
informatsionno-analiticheskogo otdeleniia KGB pri SM Lit SSR – maiorE.K.Andriatis. Date: 24 May 1972); 114-116 (Operativnaia svodka za 24maia 1972 g. From: Nachal’nik IAO KGB pri SM Lit. SSR – maiorE.K.Andriatis. Date: 25 May 1972); 117-121 (Operativnaia svodka za 25maia 1972 g. From: Nachal’nik informatsionno-analiticheskogo otdeleniiaKGB pri SM Lit. SSR – maior E.Andriatis. Date: 16 May 1972); 122-126(Operativnaia svodka za 26 maia 1972 g. From: Nachal’nikinformatsionno-analiticheskogo otdeleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR –maior E.Andriatis. Date: 27 May 1972); 127-130 (Operativnaia svodka za27 maia 1972 g. From: Nachal’nik informatsionno-analiticheskogootdeleniia KGB pri SM Lit. SSR – maior Andriatis. Date: 28 May 1972).
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3. The economic world of the third departmentThe KGB unit responsible for counter-intelligence in the economy ofSoviet Lithuania was the third department of the second (counter-intelligence) administration. In this section we describe the thirddepartment, its raison d’être, and its sphere of responsibility.
3.1. Raison d’êtreWithin the KGB second (counter-intelligence) administration, the 26-strong third department was responsible for industry, science, andtransport. Its goals were implied more often than stated, but they areclearly set out in a plan of work for a later year, 1981:15Exposure and suppression of the agent activity of the special servicesof the adversary.Prevention of the collection of intelligence information by the use oflegal possibilities and technical means.Defence of state secrets.Prevention of emergencies and of the occurrence of negativesituations and processes in establishments of industry, science,transport, and communications.Provision of defence of the economy and financial system.Provision of security during the nineteenth congress of the communistparty of Lithuania and the twenty sixth congress of the CPSU.According to Grybkauskas (2009), the third department in Vilniusfaced continual challenges to its existence. The USSR KGB typicallyestablished a third department for counterintelligence supervision ofspecialized defence industry facilities. But there were no such facilities inLithuania. In Moscow, KGB officials were sceptical about the relevance ofcounter-intelligence operations in facilities of lower securityclassification, and were reluctant to approve the lists of secure facilitiesthat Lithuanian officers put forward. The secondary justification ontowhich the Lithuania KGB fell back was the presence of large numbers ofpolitically unreliable persons in the industrial workforce. Their case was
15 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/760, 1-25 (Plan osnovnykh agenturno-operativnykh meropriiatii 3 Otdela 2 Upravleniia KGB Litovskoi SSR na1981 god. From: Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB Litovskoi SSRpodpolkovnik M. Misiukonis Date: 20 December 1981).
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illustrated by documents such as that reported in Table 7. The story inthis table is that, as of the late 1960s, just under 2,000 persons meritingattention for one suspicious reason another were employed in theLithuanian public sector. Typical of the KGB documentation of this type isthe lack of analytical structure, so that people representing risks of verydifferent types or for very different reasons are lumped together,including some (“Visited capitalist and developing countries asspecialists”) that might be thought entirely innocent. We’ll considermarkers of suspicion later in more detail.Grybkauskas also observes some changes over time in the pattern ofKGB supervision. In the 1970s the international climate became warmer.With greater East-West cooperation, he suggests, one might haveexpected KGB supervision of industry and transport to become lessintense. However, KGB reports consistently detected heightened activityon the part of hostile forces and among foreign specialists. Theimplication is that the local KGB was protecting its resources.Evaluation of the KGB’s successes and failures in these activities ishard to find. Grybkauskas (2009, p. 111) considers that over time theKGB’s methods of work became more effective and flexible, with lessarbitrary interference in firm-level management, but it was alwayslimited by a narrow security perspective.
3.2. Science and industry: the secure facilitiesIn this section we describe how the KGB regulated Lithuania’s keyeconomic installations. In science and industry there were several circlesof secrecy, illustrated in Table 8. In the innermost circle was a handful offacilities designated “of special importance” (this normally had a defenceconnotation) or “closed.” Beyond them was a much larger number offacilities that were considered important to the national economy (butnot to defence). The numbers of plants in both these categories wasgrowing quite slowly through the sixties, but their workforce wasexpanding rapidly – that of the closed facilities doubled between the earlyand late years of the decade. Finally there were transport andcommunication utilities (and fisheries, which involved sending ships andmen to international waters), which were relatively slow-growing.While we do not have public sector employment in Lithuania forexactly contemporaneous years, Figure 4 allows a visual comparison ofthe trends underlying Table 8. From beginning to end of the 1960sLithuania’s public sector workforce (i.e. just about everyone other thanconvicts and collective farmers) was expanding at more than 5 percent ayear, but the first two categories of KGB-supervised employment weregrowing at least twice as fast. Also rising at the same rapid rate was the
16
number of staff in the closed facilities who were cleared for access toclassified documentation.What kinds of facilities came under KGB supervision? Elsewhere in theSoviet Union, the closed facilities “of special importance” would have beenspecialized defence factories but, as a relatively agrarian border province,Lithuania did not have any of these. (Leningrad was always a centre of thedefence industry, and Estonia, which lay between Lithuania andLeningrad, had 14 specialized defence plants in 1984 according toGrybkauskas 2009, p. 97.) The nearest that Lithuania had was a handful offacilities engaged in intermediate production and subcontracting fordefence, and these were the ones that formed the inner circle.What was their general type? Table 9 lists them in a later year, 1978.All were engaged in electronics of one form or another, especially radioand radar. Seven (of 11) were in Vilnius, three in Kaunas, and one in
Šiauliai. All were issued with coded mailbox numbers; that of KNIIRIT, theKaunas Research Institute for Radar Equipment, for example, was “V-8574.”Codenames and mailbox numbers raised security only if thoseresponsible for communications rigorously separated them frominformation that could link them to real names and addresses. As a result,the issue of codenames was associated with complex instructions toprotect them. As security increased, usability declined – a pattern familiarto anyone with a password-protected bank account. This created thepredictable risk of procedural workarounds and violations (Harrison2013a is a case study from another context). The KGB third department’splan of work for 1967, for example, included a commitment “to carry outseminar activities focusing attention on clarification of the requirementsof Instruction no. 00150-1965 and Statute no. 100-ss – 1965 ‘On theprocedure for use of conventional and open nomenclature.’”16The territories of the closed facilities were screened from regulartraffic and secured by controlled access. Employees’ workplaceconversations were monitored and their contacts with visitors wererestricted. Foreign visitors were excluded altogether or, if admitted, were
16 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 55 (Plan agenturno-operativnykhmeropriiatij 1-go otdeleniia 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM LitovskoiSSR po usileniiu kontrrazvedovatel’nogo obespecheniia vazhnykhob”ektov promyshlennosti na 1967 god. From: Zam. nachal’nika 3 otdela2 upravleniia KGB pri SM Lit SSR – st. lejtenant Markunas. Date: 9 January1967).
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shown equipment and products designed to mislead, while secret
activities were temporarily suspended (Burinskaitė, 2007, p. 101). 17Lithuania’s outer ring of secrecy comprised a much larger number offacilities that were considered important to the national economy,although not to the military: 107 in 1968 (listed in Appendix Table A-1).They were by no means all government ministries or industrial plants.Detailed consideration puts them in five distinct categories:
 Economic regulators (3 facilities) were Lithuania’s planningcommission, branch of the USSR state bank, and statisticaladministration.
 Science-based facilities (34 facilities) provided R&D services orelectronic products.
 Location-based activities (26 facilities) involved civil defence andborder security (including ports and airports) and activities linkedto resource exploitation involving cartography and aerialphotography.
 Network utilities (37 facilities) supplied power, gas, and water, andrailway, highway, mail, and cable and wireless services.
 Heavy industry plants (7 facilities) were such as shipyards andfertilizer factories.These facilities were spread among nine urban districts as shownFigure 5. In a centralized society where cities, industries, and politicalpower had common origins, it is not surprising to see the prominence ofthe capital city. Vilnius had a monopoly of the economic regulators, forexample. It is also interesting to see the importance of Lithuania’s seaport
Klaipėda (for location-based activities) and a smaller town, Šiauliai, as an important railway node (and a staging post for missile troopsheadquartered in the town and deployed in the neighbouring woodlands).Table 10 gives a sense of the distribution of KGB-regulated facilitiesrelative to town size. It shows the proportions of KGB-regulated facilitiesin each category that are found in the five largest towns, divided by theproportion of urban residents of each town in 1970. Thus, in 1970 Vilniusaccommodated nearly one quarter of all urban residents and nearly twofifths of regulated facilities, so the number that appears in the top lefthand cell is approximately two fifths divided by one quarter, or 1.6: KGB-regulated facilities were 1.6 times more likely to be found in Vilnius than
17 Such visits could be made only by decision of the USSR Council ofMinisters, after consultation with the KGB and armed forces General Staff.Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 29-30 (Vypiska iz instruktsii o poriadkeprimeneniia Pravil prozhivaniia inostrantsev i lits bez grazhdanstva vSSSR. Date: 28 February 1969).
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a randomly chosen urban resident. What is evident, then, is that KGB-regulated facilities were actually fairly evenly spread among the fivetowns, given their size, but with somewhat fewer in Kaunas (with arelative frequency of 1.1), and they were rather concentrated in Šiauliai(relative frequency 2.4).Category by category, the table confirms that economic regulation and
science was centred in Vilnius, location-based activities in Klaipėda, and network utilities in Šiauliai.What did the third department aim to do in relation to these facilitieswhen it supervised them? Its objectives are summarized in a plan of workdated March 1968:18To study more deeply the environment of the employees ofenterprises and organizations who are bearers of important statesecrets with the aim of potential exposure of persons trying to gatherinformation of a secret character from them.Through the agent network and trusted persons, to carry out diligentverification of Soviet specialists visiting the capitalist and developingcountries on lengthy assignments with the aim of exposing suspiciouscontacts in communication with the adversary’s intelligenceestablished during foreign visits on work assignments. To addressparticular attention to those specialists with access to state secrets.Provisions of the plan for 1968 included the deployment of agents tocarry out surveillance of military rail freights, the mail and telephones,left luggage facilities, foreigners, radio enthusiasts, stamp collectors, andthe fishing fleet and merchant marine, and especially to build the agentnetwork in the transport sector; and to prepare for events such as visitsand exhibitions.Another aspect of agent work was to take part in consciousness-raising among the workers:At the start of the mass tourist season (May) hold discussions amongthe collectives of the industrial facilities designated for display toforeigners about political vigilance and the struggle with theadversary’s ideological diversions.
18 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 1-13 (Plan agenturno-operativnoi raboty3 otdela 2-go Upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR ma 1968 god. From:Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSRpodpolkovnik Akimov. Date: 4 March 1968).
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For more detail we turn to a report from 1969 on the KGB regime inone of the closed facilities, the Kaunas radar research institute (KNIIRIT,listed in Table 9).19 Founded 1958, KNIIRIT had 1,217 employees at thistime. KNIIRIT is described as open, but with some closed units workingon defence contracts; there was armed security and a special warehousefor the storage of secret items.The report lists the main security risks and assets in KNIIRIT. On therisk side, hundreds of people were cleared for access to secretdocumentation. Even at a small, part-time defence contractor, twelvepersons had the highest clearance (“form 1,” controlling access to topsecrets “of special importance”); 192 had “form 2” (top secret), 71 “form3” (secret), and 121 “form 4” (confidential). There was a substantial flowof classified correspondence: roughly one hundred items per month(counting both in and out) during the year to October. This in itself was arisk because, as other correspondence shows, simple instructionsdesigned to ensure secure correspondence among the numberedenterprises were often ignored. The main risk was that, without theproper classification, secret telegrams could be transmitted andintercepted by Western radio. 20Because KNIIRIT was a small link in a complex supply chain, itsemployees were continually in contact with outside suppliers andpurchasers and external visits were frequent, around 200 per month(again counting both in and out). Among the staff were persons who hadvisited capitalist and socialist countries on exchanges and as tourists;some had family ties and had met family members abroad or receivedthem as visitors. While Kaunas was closed to foreign tourists at that time,foreign specialists could and did visit from Britain, France, and Italy whiledelivering imported equipment, and were therefore in a position togather information.What else did the KGB do when it regulated these establishments? Itfrequently inspected the conditions of storage and handling of secretcorrespondence (described by Harrison 2013b). It vetted employees forsecurity clearance; we discuss this separately below. It looked into all
19 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 120-124 (Spravka. From: Nachal’nik otd-ja3 otdela Komiteta gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSRmajor Kazakov. Date: October 1969).
20 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/652, 22-22 (From: I.o. predsedatelja KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR podpolkovnikPetkjavichjus. To: Upolnomochennomu KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR (1 otdel2 upravleniia) podpolkovniku Kardanovskomu. Date: 27 September1966).
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untoward events in order to establish the causes of disruption; this toowe discuss below. Finally, the KGB was responsible for delivering endlesslectures and interminable discussions in the workplace on the need forpolitical vigilance in the protection of state secrets.21
3.3. The railways: trainspottingTransport facilities were of particular concern to the KGB. For the SovietUnion this was still the railway age, before mass air and automobiletransport. Everywhere the railways were the first great unitarycorporation of the modern age. Hierarchical, centralized, expanding,colonizing, coordinated from top to bottom to the last detail, theysymbolized Soviet administrative ideals. The KGB interest in the railwayshad three main aspects, which we consider in no particular order. Theywere the main route by which foreigners arrived in Lithuania and left it.They also supplied Lithuania’s military bases with troops and weapons.Finally, if the Soviet Union’s command economy could not run a railway itcould not run anything, so accidents and delays instantly attracted theattention of the KGB.The monitoring of foreigners on the railways did not involve anythingbeyond routine surveillance. The KGB’s interest in military traffic wasmore complex. On the front line of the Cold War, Lithuania wasintensively populated by troops and weapons, including nuclear weaponsand missiles, supplied and rotated by train. This military trafficrepresented a security risk – and also an opportunity. The opportunitywas to find out who was watching.A KGB counter-intelligence plan of January 1972 shows how this wasdone.22 The plan anticipated 32 military trains that would enter the
21 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/656, 87 (Tezisy vystupleniia: O sostoianiiagenturno-operativnoi raboty po usileniiu rezhima sekretnosti naob”ektakh promyshlennosti, svjazi i transporta, po obespecheniiusekretnosti i bezopasnosti sledovaniia po zheleznoi doroge special’nykhvoinskih transportov. Date: 24 February 1966); K-1/3/668, 4-13 (Planagenturno-operativnykh meropriiatij po promyshlennym ob”ektam na 1-e polugodie 1969 goda. From: nachal’nik 3 otdeleniia Kaunasskogogorotdela KGB pri SM LSSR major Truhachev. Date: 12 February 1969); K-1/3/668, 179 (Spravka o rezul’tatakh raboty 3-go otdeleniia za 1969 god.From: Nachal’nik 3 otd-ia Kaunasskogo gorotdela KGB pri SM Lit. SSR –maior Trukhachev. Date: 9 December 1969). 179.
22 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/695, 3-7 (Plan agenturno-operativnykhmeropriiatii po obespecheniiu sekretnosti i bezopasnosti voinskikhperevozok. From: Nachal’nik 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR
21
country over the next ten days. We paraphrase the detail as follows:Tighten scrutiny of those already under surveillance to see whether anyof them showed heightened interest in the railways over the period of themilitary freight movements; mobilize the KGB agents and trusted personson the railways to watch their colleagues (and anyone else) for suspiciousbehaviour; watch the outgoing mail from the districts affected for lettersand packets going abroad; tighten scrutiny of those previously convictedof espionage and so on, now living on the territory of the republic afterserving out their terms; mount a watch on the stations where militarytrains would stop for servicing to spot bystanders showing undueinterest; keep a check on the timetable for movement and delivery of themilitary freights; use the KGB agents and trusted persons on the railwaysto avoid or manage timetable disruptions affecting the military freights;tighten scrutiny of foreigners visiting Vilnius who might have connectionswith foreign intelligence; this was done separately for diplomats andtourists from capitalist countries, and for students; monitor internationaltelephone calls to identify callers who coincide repeatedly with thepassage of military freights, and to listen in on any conversationsinvolving people who have called abroad before; monitor the radiofrequencies for suspicious transmissions; use the KGB agents and trustedpersons on the railways to watch for suspicious contacts with foreignersand possible caches of secret material on trains leaving the country;collate the information acquired.In the file, the plan is followed by a summary of privatecorrespondence that the KGB intercepted from the international mailover the period of the operation and copies of many of personal letters. 23There were some that wondered whether the fuss over secret militaryshipments on the railways went too far. The security arrangements thatcovered them, with everyone being hauled out of bed and ordered to rusharound in the middle night, made concealment virtually impossible.24 One
polkovnik Naras, nachal’nik 5 otdela KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR polkovnikShchensnovichius. Date: 28 January 1972).
23 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/695, 8-62 (Dannye “PK” o litsakhsistematicheski otpravliaiushchikh pochtovuiu korrespondentsiiu v kap.strany vo vremia prokhozhdeniia voinskikh perevozok po zh.d. za 1972god. Date: 2 March 1973).
24 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 121-131 (From: Predsedatel’ KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR polkovnikPetkjavichjus. To: Zamestiteliu nachal’nika 2 glavnogo upravleniiaKomiteta Gospezopasnosti pri SM Soiuza SSR polkovniku tovarishhuGorbatenko A.M. Date: October 1967); K-1/3/654, 144-151 (Spravka: Ovypolnenii postanovleniia biuro TsK KP Litvy BC-23/9 ot 21.9.1966 g. “Ob
22
solution that was mooted was to make an equal fuss about shipments thatwere unconnected with the military. In September 1967, for example,Lieutenant Colonel Žilinskas of the Šiauliai KGB administrationrecommended Vilnius to consider running empty trucks of the kind usedfor military shipments in regular trains as well.25It is possible that the fuss served the regime in another way. Obvioussecrets naturally attracted those that had failed to internalize Sovietvalues of discretion and vigilance, people who would be vulnerable toexploitation by the foreign adversary or who might be willing to servethem voluntarily. Attracted like moths to a flame, these were the verypeople that the KGB wanted to observe.The KGB understood this logic perfectly well and even exploited it. Inthe spring of 1965, under an operation codenamed “Neman,” the KGBorganized two months of unusually intensive military rail traffic. Thepurpose of this operation was not to move troops and weapons into theright positions but to create a stir that enemy agents and disloyal citizenswould be drawn to, so that they could be identified and exposed.26 Whileit is clear that the main prize of this operation would have been to exposeforeign intelligence agents, interest in identifying Soviet citizens that wereunduly curious was also often explicit; a memo of 1972 refers to the needto identify “self-motivated people” (samoinitsiativniki) “who, driven bytheir own hostile attitude to the existing system, may collect secretinformation about military facilities, with the aim of subsequentlyhanding them over to the adversary.”27
usilenii rezhima sekretnosti” na predpriiatiiakh i uchrezhdeniiakhrespubliki. From: Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2 upr. KGB pri SM Lit SSRpodpolkovnik Akimov. Date: 22 November 1967).
25 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 101-104 (From: Nachal’nik SHiauliaiskogogorotdela KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik ZHilinskas. To:Zam. nachal’nika 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSRstarshemu leitenantu tovarishchu Morkunasu. Date: 16 September 1967).
26 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/644, 70-75 (Lithuania KGB secondadministration, first department chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Naras, reporton counter-intelligence work around military facilities of specialimportance, 4 February 1966).
27 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/694, 3-6 (Spravka o sostoianiikontrrazvedovatel'noi raboty Shiauliaiskogo go v okruzhenii voennykhob"ektov. From zam. nachal'nika 1 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SMLitovskoi SSR podpolkovnik Domarkas, zam. nachal'nika 3 otdela 2upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR podpolkovnik Matulionis, st.op/ud1 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri sm Litovskoi SSR kapitan Spiridonov,
23
In other words, Soviet norms prescribed that the loyal citizen shouldnot be curious about matters concerning which there was no need toknow. Thus trainspotting, like planespotting and stamp collecting, becamea marker for potential disloyalty.
4. The agent networkIn this section we describe the Lithuania KGB third department’s agentnetwork among staff and employees of the secure facilities. The agentnetwork was the KGB’s principal source of domestic intelligence. Themain elements of the network were the agents, trusted persons, and thehandful of part-timers (vneshtatnye sotrudniki) placed in the securefacilities. Associated with the network were other informants who wereusually motivated to provide signals by discontent with managementpolicies or activities or personal grudges.Agents of the third department, 206 in number according to a reportof July 1969, were typically 25 to 50 years of age, in white collaremployment and with some experience of higher education. 28 Most weresettled in the agent network, with 5 to 15 years of KGB experience. Asignificant minority of 40 knew one or more foreign languages; 16 hadfamily in the West. Notably, the KGB held “comprising evidence” against13 of them but only 5 were directly coerced into cooperation (“recruitedby means of kompromat”).
The same report, by Captain Markūnas, also evaluates the quality of alerts from the agent network negatively, as having an “informationcharacter, such as insignificant production mishaps at facilities,” whichmeans that they lacked analysis or attribution of responsibility.The density of agent deployment in the secure facilities was variablebut (on the basis of limited evidence) was typically much higher than the3.8 per thousand average across Soviet Lithuania. At the Baltiia shipyard,
Klaipėda, classed as economically important (but not “of special importance), with 3,107 employees in 1974, there were 52 informers (17
op/ud 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri sm Litovskoi SSR st. leitenantElimakhov. To . Date: 11 April 1972).
28 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 92-110 (Spravka: o sostoianii raboty sagenturoi v 3-m otdele 2 Upravleniia Komiteta gosbezopasnosti priSovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR po sostoianiiu na 1 iiulia 1969 g. From:Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2 upravleniia Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri SoveteMinistrov Lit SSR – kapitan Markunas. Date: 8 July 1969). A later surveydated 1977 showed that, of 124 agents of the third department, therewere 42 senior managers, 76 middle managers, and 5 workers (LYA b.742, l. 65: Spravka o deiatel’nosti 3 otdela 2 upravleniia).
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per thousand. 29 In Kaunas at the closed KNIIRIT institute, classed as “ofspecial importance”, with 1,207 employees in 1968, there were 32informers (26 per thousand).30The report just cited evaluates the quality of the agent network inKNIIRIT. Three high-level agents had access to secrets and could mix withthose doing secret work. These were the chief of quality control, theclimate lab technician, and the deputy chief accountant. In contrast amechanic and a boiler-room employee “are not in a position to render ustangible assistance in tackling the tasks of the division of providing forconservation of state secrets.” In the secret laboratories “no agentnetwork exists for exposure of persons of interest to the organs of statesecurity and the prevention of potential outflow of secret information.”Regardless of their level, the report finds, the agents’ value was low.The quality chief continually mixed with people doing secret work andfrequently visited other closed facilities, but was given no assignmentsand reported no alerts. The climate lab technician was no better. In twoand a half years, the report concludes, the KGB had received seven alerts:two cases of undue interest in secret matters, two possible contacts withforeigners, one case of false identification papers, one case in which theministry mistakenly mailed out its own secret documents, and one othersecrecy violation. Of the seven, two were found to be without foundation,and the case of undue interest in secret matters arose from ignoranceconcerning duties. That left two to be dealt with by issuing a KGB caution,and two by disciplinary measures.Other reports give an impression of the composition of alerts received
in 1969 from agents and trusted persons in Panevėžys and Kaunas, shown in Table 11. This might be a moment to recall Alec Nove’s characterizationof the role of the workplace informer: “they were more likely to be rousedby a disrespectful remark about Stalin than by, say, the overspending of
29 Specifically there were one vneshtatnyi sotrudnik, 8 agents, and atotal of 43 trusted persons. Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/711, 93-103 (spravka posudostroitel'nomu zavodu "baltiia". From operupolnomochennyi 1 otd-iaokgb st. leitenant v.kulikov, nachal'nik 1 otdeleniia okgb pri tsm lssr pogor klaipede i lmb kapitan k.petrikas. To . Date: 20 May 1974). The Baltiiashipyard was “known” to be a target for foreign espionage. Hoover/LYA,K-1/3/711, 104-104 ( . From nachal'nik 2 upravleniia KGB pri SoveteMinistrov LSSR polkovnik A.Naras. To nachal'nik otdela KGB pri SM Lit.SSR po gor. Klaipede i litovskomu morskomu basseinu podpolkovnikutov. Basenko A.Ia.. Date: 7 March 1974).
30 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 120-124 (Spravka. From: Nachal’nik otd-ja3 otdela Komiteta gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSRmajor Kazakov. Date: October 1969).
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the wage fund.” We see that the reality was somewhere between. Thelargest single category of alerts concerned anti-Soviet expressions of onekind or another. A minority did raise management concerns, such asdisorganization or disruption.In the spring of 1968 we find Lieutenant Colonel Matulionis of thethird department asking what it was all for:31In the jubilee year of 1967 and the past four months of 1968, noemergencies or facts of the escape of information constituting a statesecret have been established in the facilities of industry, transport,and communications. At the same time it is a source of anxiety thatdefects in the provision of the regime of secrecy in industrial facilities,institutions, and organizations continue to occur, as a result of whichfour secret documents were lost in 1966-67.The results of work cannot satisfy the communists of the thirddepartment. They should be alert to the fact that for some time no newcases have arisen of operational investigation of persons suspected ofspying activity and no alerts are forthcoming on this matter thatdeserve serious attention. Nor has it been possible to obtain alertsdeserving attention about the intentions of the special services of theadversary towards industrial facilities.[…] Too little attention is being given to study of processes andmanifestations among collectives of industrial facilities, transport, andcommunications, to expose evidence of the impact of the ideologicalintentions of the special services of the adversary towards particularemployees, to expose manifestations and situations that could lead tothe emergence of open mass demonstrations, and to the suppressionof instances of the preparation of firearms and home-made explosivedevices.[…] As a result of the work done among foreign specialists visiting therepublic we have not succeeded in exposing persons connected withthe special services of the adversary, or to identify their practicalactivities and the intentions of foreign intelligence services towardsthe republic, although suspicious factors in the behaviour of somespecialists have been exposed.
31 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 14-23 (Spravka: o zadachakhoperativnogo sostava 3 otdela 2 Upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR pouluchsheniiu kontrrazvedyvatel’noi raboty na obsluzhivaemykhob”ektakh. From: Nachal’nik 2 otdeleniia 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB priSovete Ministrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik Matulionis. Date: 24 April 1968).
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The basic cause of this situation is that we insufficiently implementmeasures to create particular circumstances in which foreigners mightshow themselves up as agents of foreign intelligence services …At the same time, Matulionis pointed out, the agent network of the thirddepartment completely missed two real criminals, Baltušaitis (who
exploded a bomb in Tauragė railway station, which was bad enough) and Kryshenkov (who was shamefully, disgracefully permitted to explode abomb in Red Square). Both men were self-motivated and self-driven. Butboth had prepared their devices using industrial facilities, under thenoses of the agent network, which had completely failed to raise alerts oftheir activities. Warming to his theme, Matulionis went on to use wordsthat we have cited already:Our communists should be concerned daily to study and know moredeeply processes that are essentially anomalous, that is, incorrect,
deviating from the general rule of processes and phenomena, and in atimely way to receive alerts leading to the exposure of personsintending to carry out hostile actions that can lead to seriousconsequences.[…] It has not been possible to expose and detain a single foreignerred-handed, at a time of potentially hostile behaviour. No letters havecome into our hands that are of operational interest, discarded byforeigners at stations where international trains have halted orairports.
Finally, as Burinskaitė (2007) has described, the efforts made to camouflage Lithuania’s industrial facilities were unsuccessful. The factsabout their true research and production activities leaked abroad. Theprimary sources were Lithuanian specialists who made foreign visits,sometimes even carrying small hardware items such as microprocessors.
5. The managersIn this section we describe the KGB’s influence over human capitalformation in the Soviet economy. We begin by explaining the role of theKGB in the selection and promotion of managers. The KGB could not carryout this role without access to the person-level information provided byits historical records and the mass surveillance undertaken by its agentnetwork. Person-level information was known generically as“compromising evidence” (kompromat). We use some KGB lists toillustrate the nature of kompromat and some patterns in its distribution.
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5.1. Management selectionThe KGB was deeply integrated into the personnel function in all Sovietorganizations. As already mentioned, there does not seem to have beenany management position of significance in the Soviet economy that didnot require access to classified documentation and correspondence.Documentation was classified at various levels (“special file,” top secret,secret, and confidential) and every management post required access upto one of these levels. The first (secret) departments of enterprises andorganizations compiled lists of positions requiring access, and submittedthem to the KGB for approval.In principle, no one could be appointed to such a position without firstbeing cleared to the level appropriate to the post, and the approval ordenial of clearance was also the job of the KGB. The process began whenthe employer’s first department submitted a person for clearance, basedon their work record and the short political and professional biographythat every applicant or supplicant composed in place of a curriculumvitae. The responsible KGB officer opened a “clearance file” (delodopuska), to which would be added the results of consultation with localparty bodies and of searching in the KGB archive. On that evidence, therequest was approved or denied.In 1979 in Soviet Lithuania, according to Grybkauskas (2007a, p. 80),14,000 personnel had clearance for “top secret (special file)”documentation. In an earlier year, 1973, 2,027 clearances were issued atthe “secret” level compared with 2,230 at the higher levels (Grybkauskas2007a, p. 84). Applying that proportion in the flow to the total cleared in1979 at the higher levels would suggest a stock of approximately 27,000cleared personnel for Soviet Lithuania in 1979, or 0.8 per cent of thepopulation at the time.32 Their distribution across the economy must havebeen highly skewed. This is confirmed by the figures in Table 6, whichshow that around one quarter of the rapidly growing workforce of thesmall number of “closed” factories of “special importance” was cleared foraccess to secret paperwork. Evidently the proportions elsewhere weremuch lower.Clearance could be granted but it could also be denied. The refusalrate in Soviet Lithuania across all employments in 1973, and again in
32 This was half the proportion in the United States in 2011, when 4.8million U.S. personnel, or 1.5% of the total U.S. population, were clearedfor access to information classified at all levels (U.S. ODNI 2012, p. 3).
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1981, was around 7 percent (Grybkauskas 2006, p. 84).33 The limitedevidence detailed in the next section suggests that more commonly citedwere historical markers of family association with Lithuania’s prewarelite or hostility towards Soviet rule in Lithuania, or dispossession andforced resettlement during the transition to Soviet rule. Smaller numberswere tagged as actively religious or hostile to Soviet rule in the present orrecent past.34The clearance system faced the KGB with two main problems, both ofwhich rose up from below. One was the growing number of positionsrequiring clearance; the other was managers’ resistance to theenforcement of clearance decisions on personnel. Rising numbers, alreadyillustrated in Table 8, put growing demands on KGB resources.According to Grybkauskas (2008, p. 36), growth was driven by severalfactors. One factor was the supply privileges of the numbered factories,which enabled them to expand at the expense of the surroundingeconomy. Another factor was the rising number of requests for clearancefrom facilities that did not fall into any secret category but had links withthe numbered factories that they could not develop without clearance tovisit. Without visitation rights these intermediaries and subcontractorscould not exploit the personal networks and exchange of favours thatconverted lifeless plan decrees into human action. There was highturnover among employees with visitation needs, which generated a largevolume of clearance requests; it also meant a spreading circle of clearedpersons that were typically untrained and inexperienced in the handlingof classified information.KNIIRIT, for example, lost 256 employees cleared for “top secret” and“secret” documentation in just two years, 1965 and 1966. On the evidence
33 In the United States in 2011 refusals ran from zero to 1.2% ofapplications to the Defense Intelligence Agency, FBI, National Geo-SpatialIntelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and StateDepartment. For the CIA refusals ran at more than 5%, and they reached8% at the National Security Agency (ODNI 2012, p. 7). No average is given,but the CIA and State are relatively small employers, suggesting anaverage refusal rate well below 5 percent.
34 For example Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/703, 90-122 (Spisok lits,dopushchenykh k sov. sekretnoi rabote i dokumentam skomprometarialami. From: Nachal’nik Panevizhskogo GO KGB pri SoveteMinistrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik S Iu. Kishonas. Date: 3 December 1972).Despite its title this document lists 6 persons cleared notwithstanding theexistence of negative markers, and ten persons refused clearance onaccount of them, and also refers to 59 persons refused permission totravel abroad because of them. See also Burinskaite (2006).
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already cited, this was around one third of its “cleared” workforce peryear. High turnover, according to the KGB, was stimulated by otheremployers’ offering “higher pay and better accommodation.”35 Underlyingthis was the endemic and persistent labour shortage in the Sovieteconomy.Finally, there was direct inflation: security classifications werearbitrary to some extent, and caution led to over-classification, so thatnew lines of work were classified while old lines were not declassified,and so on. The inflation was countered by periodic reviews that aimed tocut back the number of posts requiring clearance: by 30 percent inindustry and science across the republic in 1963, for example.36The enforcement problem arose, apparently, from the costs ofcompliance. Organizations and factories were reluctant to implementsecurity instructions, and sought to avoid compliance by means of delayand negotiation.Full compliance with the clearance system presented managers withmany issues. While there is no direct evidence on this, it appears that theclearance process was evidently time consuming, because employeesappointed to positions that required it were sometimes admitted to secretcorrespondence before receiving the necessary clearance.37 When aperson was refused clearance, the director’s first headache was to explainthe decision to the employee without mentioning the KGB veto; refusalhad to be justified on some other grounds, such as some fault in theemployee’s conduct or performance.Managers regularly nominated completely unsuitable people forclearance. The same report of the Kaunas KGB identifies several cases.One person was an alcoholic. He repeatedly lost secret documents in hischarge and, although reprimanded, was not removed from secret work.
35 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 112-13 (Spravka: o merakh po usileniiurezhima sekretnosti na predpriiatiiakh i v uzhrezhdeniiakh g. Kaunasa.To: Nachal’nik 3 otdeleniia Kaunasskogo gorotdela KGB pri SM LSSR –maior Trukhachev. Date: 12 October 1967).
36 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 122 (From: Predsedatel’ KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR polkovnikPetkiavichius. To: Zamestiteliu nachal’nika 2 glavnogo upravleniiaKomiteta Gospezopasnosti pri SM Soiuza SSR polkovniku tovarishchuGorbatenko A.M. Date: oktiabr’ 1967).
37 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 101-104 (From: Nachal’nik Shiauliaiskogogorotdela KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik ZHilinskas. To:Zam. nachal’nika 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSRstarshemu leitenantu tovarishchu Morkunasu. Date: 16 September 1967).
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Another person had been a Christian Democrat, a leader of the BoyScouts, a collaborator under German occupation, and a resister againstSoviet rule. Returning (after amnesty) from a 25-year jail term, hecontinued to maintain hostile views. In the Institute of Land Organizationhe had access to classified documents and edited the wall newspaper.Working for the Kaunas civil defence staff, a third person carried on avoluminous correspondence with friends and relatives in America andIsrael. A fourth worked in the ministry of communications, and hadalready been granted clearance when it turned out that various familymembers had served before the war in the Lithuanian army officer corps,had sheltered members of the nationalist insurgency, and had fled abroador been sentenced to internal exile.38When the KGB refused clearance, managers sometimes ignored theoutcome. Examples from Kaunas and Šiauliai, for example, are reported insummaries of 1968 and 1969.39 In some cases clearance was deniedrepeatedly, yet the person concerned remained in post. In Šiauliai, it issaid:The enterprise leaders in the given case[s] argue that these persons donot become acquainted with secret documents.The facts speak otherwise.And a case is cited of a classified letter signed recently by one of thoseinvolved.According to Grybkauskas (2008, pp. 37-39), the KGB had limitedcapacity to manage the managers that procrastinated “for the good of thecause,” and few sanctions with which to discipline their passive
38 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 105-120 (Spravka: o merakh po usileniiurezhima sekretnosti na predpriiatiiakh i v uzhrezhdeniiakh g. Kaunasa.To: Nachal’nik 3 otdeleniia Kaunasskogo gorotdela KGB pri SM LSSR –maior Trukhachev. Date: 12 October 1967).
39 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 24-24 (Zapiska : po “VCh” iz g. Kaunasa.From: Zam gorotdela KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR po gorodu Kaunasu –podpolkovnik Snakin. To: Nachal’niku 2 upravleniia KGB pri SoveteMinistrov Litovskoi SSR polkovniku tov. Narasu A.I. No date.); K-1/3/664,29-36 (From: Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri SoveteMinistrov Litovskoi SSR IU. Petkiavichius. To: TSentral’nyi KomitetKommunisticheskoi Partii Litvy. Date: 7 May 1968). Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 45-49 (From: nachal’nik SHiauliaiskogo gorotdela KGB pri SMLitovskoi SSR – polkovnik ZHilinskas. To: Zam predsedatelia KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri SM Litovskoi SSR polkovniku – tov. AleksandrovuM.N. Date: 30 January 1969).
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resistance. Directors appeared readily to survive conflicts with KGBofficers without suffering career damage; perhaps it was worse for themanager to fail in the plan than to fail in security. More than anythingelse, this marks the dramatic change in the political atmosphere sinceStalin’s time, when the manager that ignored the NKVD put his own neckon the block. Grybkauskas quotes the Elfa electrical engineering factorydirector on how he got around the KGB supervisor, known as the“guardian angel.” On several occasions the latter instructed the director toremove politically unreliable employees from their duties. The directorwas reluctant to comply, given the difficulty of replacing them. Hesuccessfully exploited the turnover of KGB supervisors to delay actioncontinuously, in one case for almost twenty years.In short, you could work around the KGB. Where procrastination andworkarounds would once have been suicidal strategies, they were nowfeasible. At the same time to work around state security cannot have beencostless; it took time, patience, and nerve, if not more.The evidence suggests that the supply of persons approved forappointment to sensitive management positions was a significantbottleneck in the economy of Soviet Lithuania. There were not enoughcleared persons to fill the vacant posts requiring clearance. The issue thatthen arose resembles the historical debate among economists (surveyedby van Brabant 1990) over the reason for queues for retail goods undercommunism: Where was the ultimate shortage: in the supply of goodsgenerally, or specifically in the provision of retail services? By analogy,did the difficulty in appointing cleared personnel reflect a specificbottleneck, the KGB’s lack of capacity to implement the clearanceprocedure in a timely way; or a more general shortage of people that wereboth loyal and competent compared with the positions that demanded tobe filled?We do not know which of these constraints was binding. We knowonly (from Grybkauskas 2009, p.106) that from 1987 the KGB began toapply more relaxed criteria to both jobs (to reduce the number ofclearances required) and persons (to issue clearances despite evidence ofpast disloyalty). Reducing the scope of employments requiring clearancewas a way to tackle the specific shortage; lowering standards was a wayto manage the general one. In other words, perhaps, not knowing whichaction they needed to take, they did both.
5.2. The usual suspectsHere we consider more detailed insights on loyalty and discriminationthat are available from a small person-level database. In December 1972
the KGB of Panevėžys (1970 population 73,000) sent Vilnius details of 176 persons against whom their files held kompromat. Listed separately
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were 6 persons cleared for access to “top secret” documentation (andtherefore holding senior positions) in spite of the evidence held; 10persons refused clearance because of the evidence held, but stilloccupying the senior positions for which clearance had been sought; 96persons refused permission to travel abroad because of the evidence held;and 79 persons occupying senior positions in spite of the evidence held.(The numbers sum to 191 but there was some double-counting, so 15people were listed twice.) Three fifths were men. Judged by their familynames, all but two were Lithuanians (compared with four fifths of theresident population in the 1970 census).The dataset is surely not the population of all those in KGB files, evenin a small market town. As a sample it would be neither random norrepresentative. The people in it were chosen because they held relativelyimportant positions or because they had applied to travel abroad; neithermakes a typical citizen. All that can be said is that the variation within thesample is suggestive.With a few gaps the lists provided each person’s full name (signallinggender and ethnicity), year of birth, level of education, party or Komsomolmembership, occupational status and/or position, and a brief descriptionof the compromising evidence in each case.The nature of the evidence strongly reflects the “dictator’s dilemma”(Wintrobe 2000, pp. 20-39): the more powerfully the ruler commands thesubject’s inner loyalty, the more carefully the subject will hide theoutward signs of what the ruler most fears: disaffection leading to hostilethought and action. The ruler cannot rely on voluntary confession toreveal disaffection and must instead exploit indirect markers or signals.We are interested to categorize the features of kompromat on twodimensions: historical versus contemporaneous, and circumstantialversus voluntary action. These are shown in Table 12. Some exampleshelp to illustrate the realities behind the numbers.
Historical/circumstantial evidence. The subject was perhaps borninto a family of the pre-Soviet urban or rural elite, or was liable toresettlement under Soviet occupation in their own right or as a familymember, or a family member collaborated with the German occupation orresisted the Soviet occupation, or fled the country after the war, or afamily member was sentenced for “state crimes.”
Historical/voluntary hostile action. The subject might havecollaborated with the German occupation or resisted the Sovietoccupation, or was sentenced for “state crimes” in their own right. Ofcourse many of those that supported German occupation acted undersome degree of coercion; equally, it’s debatable to what extent voluntaryaction was required for a a conviction under Soviet laws on counter-revolutionary crimes. Still, rightly or wrongly, many Lithuanians did have
33
pro-German sympathies in wartime or voluntarily resisted Soviet rule sothis classification seems more reasonable than the alternative.The emphasis on past repression was well founded. Working from asurvey of Soviet war refugees in Europe and America, Inkeles and Bauer(1959, 265-280), created a measure of their respondents’ underlying (asopposed to superficial) hostility to the Soviet system and looked fordeterminants in their life histories. They found that the single mostimportant factor in this hostility was “experience of arrest by the secretpolice of oneself or a family member.”
Contemporaneous/circumstantial evidence. The subject might bein correspondence with a relative abroad (who in turn might be but wasnot necessarily linked to anti-Soviet activity), or had a family member athome who was known to grumble about the regime, or was employed ator lived near a secure facility. Having a relative abroad illustrates thescope for a Catch-22: the very reason you want something becomes thegrounds on which it will be denied. You want to travel to Germanybecause your brother is there. But the fact that your brother is there canbe held against you as kompromat. And lack of family ties at home couldbe a compounding factor. A 73-year old male was denied permission totravel, for example, for no other reason than this: “His son living in
Canada is a millionaire, while [the subject] lives alone in Panevėžys.” 
Contemporaneous/voluntary hostile action. Finally, the subjectpersonally was found to be doing something in the present or recent pastthat violated Soviet rules or norms of behaviour or demonstrateddisaffection. Most common were religious observance and the expressionof openly anti-Soviet views; also included were irregular contacts withforeigners or foreign representatives.Counting signals, Table 12shows that the 176 people between themwere showing 321 instances of kompromat, of which 167, or just overhalf, could be classified as historical and involuntary, that is, the evidencereflected circumstances of the distant past over which they had never hadany control: conditions into which they were born or that were created bythe action of others. The next largest categories related tocontemporaneous circumstances (65) and (allegedly) voluntary actionsthat belonged to the historical past (55). Only one tenth (34) related tovoluntary actions that were recent or ongoing. But since these 34 actionsrelated to 34 distinct persons, they could also be associated with one fifthof the 176 people in the sample.Further analysis shows that the sample is made up of two quitedifferent groups of people. Those employed in management positions,whether cleared or uncleared, were typically young, male, and welleducated (here we give a broad-brush summary of detail found inAppendix Table A-8). A minority had party or Komsomol membership;
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few had relatives abroad. In comparison, those refused permission totravel were ten years older on average, much more likely to be female,with much less education, and very unlikely to be party members. On thewhole those refused travel did not generally have worse histories thanthe managers, but they were less discreet: the frequency of a signal ofcontemporaneous/voluntary hostile action was 29 percent, comparedwith close to zero among the managers.We learn a little more by merging the entire sample and resorting it onthe criterion of contemporaneous/voluntary hostile action. What werethe characteristics of those that maintained a bad attitude in the present,even under the watchful eyes of a well established police state, bycomparison with those that suffered only under the shadow of a doubtfulpast?Table 13 shows results. We see that those engaging in current orrecent actions that the regime considered hostile were two years olderand with two years less of education. They were substantially more likelyto be female and to have relatives abroad. On all measures they were lesslikely to carry historical markers of disloyalty. This is a product ofselection, rather than of the age difference, which has the “wrong” sign.(Other things being equal, one would expect older citizens, with moreexperience of life in independent Lithuania, to bear worse, not betterhistories.) Two differences are suggestive, however. One is that thoseengaged in current hostile activity were much more likely to haverelatives abroad. Another is that they were somewhat more likely to beparty or Komsomol members.As an organization the KGB did not do statistical analysis. Particularofficers may or may not have been intuitively aware of patterns in thedata. What might the data have given them? Most likely, what they knewalready: People whose families were expropriated or penalized in the pastoften harbour grievances in their hearts. Those that carry the stigma ofhostile social origins or associations have mostly learned to keep theirmouths shut, but some of the others have not. Party membership can be acover for disloyalty. Some of those that have won a party card against theodds think it gives them a license to say what they like.
6. Economic emergenciesA significant duty of the third department was to investigate “ChP”(chrezvychainye proizshestviya, emergency situations). Emergenciesincluded industrial accidents (including fires) and other disruptions ofproduction, power supply, railways and air transportation, so forth. Suchevents were, by definition, deviations from the plan decreed by the party.As such they raised important security questions. Whose hand was at
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work? Was it the hand of the foreign adversary, or the hand of someoneunder the adversary’s influence, or of some unnoticed person that wasworking towards the adversary of their own volition?Here more than anywhere, we see that the life of the KGB officer wasjust one damned thing after another. Incidents were numerous andfrequent. In the fields, a hayrick burned.40 A train was late; a wagon wasderailed. In the factory, equipment was damaged, materials were lost orcontaminated, employees suffered injury or death.41 Was some hostileagency behind these events? Every event had to be logged andconsidered. Unsolved cases were like toothache; they lingered, could notbe ignored, and were often hard to clear.
40 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/627, 251-255 (Spravka From: Zam.predsedatelia Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov LitovskoiSSR IU. Petkiavichus. To: Zaveduiushchemu administrativnym otdelomTSK KP Litvy tov. Kairialis A.K. Date: ianvar’ 1964). Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/637, 37-40 (Spravka: ob uchastii KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR vrassledovanii prichin pozharov v respublike. From: Zam nachal’nikasledotdela KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR – podpolkovnik IAnkevichius, zamnach 2 otdela 2 upr KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR – podpolkovnikKardanovskii. No date.).
41 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 61-62 (: Dopolnenie k spetssoobshcheniiu776 ot 15 maia 1969 g. From: Nachal’nik Mazheikskogo RO KGB pri SMLitovskoi SSR podpolkovnik K. Sarpalius. To: Nachal’niku 3 otdela 2upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR kapitanu tov. Morkunasu E.B. Date:21 May 1969); 74-75 (Spetssoobshchenie From: Nachal’nik MazheikskogoRO KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR podpolkovnik K. Sarpalius. To: Nachal’niku 3otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR kapitanu tov. MorkunasuE.B. Date: 15 May 1969); 80-82 (From: Nachal’nik Utenskogo RO KGB priSM Lit SSR podpolkovnik S. Tikhomirov. To: Nachal’niku 3 otdela 2upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR kapitanu tov. Morkunasu E.B. Date:22 May 1969); 116-119 (Dokladnaia zapiska: Ob imevshikh mestoproishestviiakh na Akmianskom tsementnom zavode za 2 polugodie 1968i 1969 god. From: Nachal’nik Mazheikskogo RO KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSRpodpolkovnik K. Sarpalius. To: Nachal’niku 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGB priSM Litovskoi SSR kapitanu tov. Morkunasu E.B., sekretariu AkmianskogoRK KP Litvy tov. Vengalisu V.P. Date: 9 September 1969); 120-124(Spravka. From: Nachal’nik otd-ia 3 otdela Komiteta gosbezopasnosti priSovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR maior Kazakov. No date.); 128-128 (From:Nachal’nik Kedainskogo RO KGB pri SM LSSR podpolkovnik V.Lesitskas.To: nachal’niku 2 upravleniia KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSRpolkovniku tovarishchu Narasu A.I. Date: 9 December 1968).
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Perhaps in the New Year of 1966 Lithuania KGB chief Randakevičius could find reason to celebrate: 42Much attention has been given to work on cases of unsolved ChP. Thiswas to implement the USSR KGB Collegium’s decision of 27 February1965. As a result, clarity has been achieved and measures adopted inseven cases of unsolved crime.But the culprits generally turned out to be as you would expect: naturalcauses, negligence, or private malice without political significance. It ishard to identify a case where sinister forces were truly at work. As thethird department’s chief lamented one year later: 43In 1966 in the facilities of the republic no serious hostilemanifestations or ChP were identified.A different kind of ChP was industrial conflict. In such cases humanagency was always at work. Large-scale strikes were exceptionally rare;temporary hold-ups, go-slows, and walk-outs at the shop level may havebeen more frequent (and poorly distinguished from supply breakdowns).A brickworks in Šiauliai district suffered a strike in February 1968, as aresult of which three shifts, 150 person-days, and 7,500 rubles of outputwere lost. The KGB reported the proximate cause of the strike as a fall inoutput leading to the non-payment of bonuses for January. The fall inoutput was in turn traced to … well, everything that was wrong with theSoviet economy: “a fuel shortage, supply of frozen materials to theworkshop, poor labour organization, a lack of showers where workerscould wash at the end of the shift, tardy provision of supplementarydinners, and the tactless and coarse attitude of the combine managementto the workers.”44 (No surprises there.)
42 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/643, 1-16 (Otchet : Ob agenturno-operativnoi isledstvennoi rabote KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR za 1965 god.From: Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete MinistrovLitovskoi SSR general-maior A Randakiavichius. To: KomitetGosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Soiuza SSR. Date: 7January 1966).
43 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/654, 1-9 (Spravka. From: Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2upr KGB pri TSM Lit SSR polkovnik Sudzilovskii. Date: 20 January 1967).
44 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 155 (Spravka. From: Nachal’nik 3 otdela 2upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR – podpolkovnik Akimov. Date: 19November 1968).
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Of more interest is a dispute that was triggered in February 1969
when the managers of a parts factory in Ukmergė district announced a decision to compensate for a previous overspending of the wage fund by a10 percent cut in piece rates. The workers went on strike and a shift was
lost. According to a subsequent report, the Ukmergė KGB rushed to the rescue in the person of Captain of State Security Ivanov, who held talkswith the managers, the party and trade union leaders, and the workers,and gave advice to all concerned: the managers as to how to manage infuture, and to the workers as to the necessity of returning to work.45 Theessence of the managers’ decision, Ivanov concluded, was correct, but itshould have been introduced more gradually and after more consultation.So, it seems, the KGB was in the business of industrial conciliation!It seems also that Alec Nove was half right: the KGB was not interestedin “overspending of the wage fund” – but it was interested in the result ofoverspending the wage fund, if the result was disruption and conflict.Finally, Ivanov’s intervention turned out to have a security aspectafter all: he uncovered among the strike leaders one man previouslysentenced to 20 years’ forced labour for treason, and another convicted ofembezzlement. The latter would be prosecuted for violent behaviour(“hooliganism”).The general experience of emergency situations in Lithuania, however,recalls a parallel, the Federal investigations of “sabotage” (FBIClassification 98) in the United States in the eras of World War II, theKorean war, and the Vietnam war(described by Haines and Langbart1993, p. 97):In almost all cases … no wilful acts of sabotage were discovered. Uponinvestigation the Bureau usually found most of the cases revolvedaround labor disputes and attempts to organize unions in plants,disgruntled workers, juveniles, and greedy entrepreneurs who soughtextra profits by providing the government with defective warmaterials.
7. Economic reformsIn the classic political economy of Stalinism, overspending the wage fundwas never a problem. Production came first. Financial discipline wasconsidered important, but never important enough to motivate wagereductions, layoffs, or other measures that might put production at risk.
45 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 26-27 (Spetssoobshchenie : From:Nachal’nik Ukmergskogo raionnogo otdeleniia KGB pri SM Lit SSRpodpolkovnik Gal’vidis. To: Tov. Obukauskasu Iu.S. Date: 5 March 1969).
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The idea that the enterprise ought to live within financial constraints, andthe resulting possibility that overspending the wage fund could havesecurity implications – these were pure products of the economic reformsof the 1960s, which were intended to harden budget constraints andimprove incentives to observe financial discipline (Kontorovich 1988).Did the KGB’s role as a regulator of the economy lead it to adopt aninstitutional perspective on the economic reforms of the time? Was theKGB an institutional supporter or opponent of economic reform? Did itwarn against moving too quickly, or too slowly, in modernizing thetraditional command system? Did the KGB have views of any kind oneconomic issues?The most direct evidence is to be found in periodic reports from theKGB to the party, usually titled “On the reactions of the population to …”(O reagirovanie naseleniia v sviazi s …). In the winter of 1963, for example,the KGB reported twice on popular responses to policy, once in November
to Lithuanian party first secretary Antanas Sniečkus on popular responses to the bread shortage arising from the failure of the Russian harvest thatyear; and a second time in December to the Lithuanian party centralcommittee.46 This was a little more than a year after the catastrophicconfrontation between workers and the regime in Novocherkassk,sparked by increases in the price of meat and butter and increases inwork norms (Baron 2001, fictionalized by Spufford 2009). Both reportsbegan with a paragraph commenting on the positive responses of themajority:The working people of the LSSR warmly support the measures of theparty and government in the spheres of domestic and foreign policyand are participating actively in implementing the plans forcommunist construction.Each report then went on to qualify the initial overall positive with asample of specific negatives. Some blamed the party leaders for shortfalls;others blamed single-party rule, the poor incentives of the collective farmsystem, and Russia, where the harvest failure was concentrated. Even aspecial delivery of white bread to Vilnius turned out to be a negative
46 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/627, 199-205 (Dokladnaia zapiska,Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov LitovskoiSSR A. Randakiavichus to Sekretariu TSentral’nogo KomitetaKommunisticheskoi Partii Litvy tovarishchu Snechkus A.Iu., Date: 6November 1963); 216-222 (Dokladnaia zapiska, From: Predsedatel’Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR A.Randakiavichus, Date: December 1963).
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because it occasioned massive queues where hopeful shoppers sharedtheir frustrations. The spread of false rumours and ironical anecdotes wasalso reported.These reports freely reproduced the names and workplaces ofindiscreet citizens; at the same time there was a striking reluctance toname their targets. One leaflet was quoted as announcing: “Down with(the name of the one of the leaders of the party and government) and hispolicy! Down with Soviet rule!” Another apparently read: “(mentioningthe name of a leader of the Soviet government) to the devil!” And another:“Announcement. Comrade (the name of a leader of the Soviet governmentis mentioned) will be hanged.”If we consider only economic matters, the other main issue from thesixties was the industrial and agricultural reforms of 1965, responses towhich were evaluated in several surveys, including two separatecatalogues of positive and negative responses.47 One could think of this
47 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/639, 7-15 (Dokladnaia zapiska: o reagirovaniinaseleniia respubliki na reshenie Plenuma TsK KPSS po voprosudal’neishego razvitiia sel’skogo khoziaistva strany. From: Zam.predsedatelia Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov LitovskoiSSR polkovnik V. Konopaveko. To: Zamestiteliu nachal’nika 2 GlavnogoUpravleniia general-maioru tov. Kardashevu A.V. Date: 3 April 1965); 37-39 (Dokladnaia zapiska. From: Zam. predsedatelia KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR podpolkovnikPetkiavichius. To: Zam. nachal’nika sluzhby 1 2 Glavnogo Upravleniia KGBpri SM Soiuza SSR polkovniku tov. Khamazinu I.V. Date: 2 October 1965);40-42 (Dokladnaia zapiska. From: Zam. predsedatelia KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR podpolkovnikPetkiavichius. To: Zam. nachal’nika sluzhby 1 2 Glavnogo Upravleniia KGBpri SM Soiuza SSR polkovniku tov. Khamazinu I.V. Date: 6 October 1965);43-44 (Memorandum: S materialov reagirovaniia naseleniia gorodaVil’nius na resheniia sentiabr’skogo Plenuma TSK KPSS (s polozhitel’noistorony). No date.); 45-46 (Memorandum: s materialov reagirovaniianaseleniia goroda Vil’nius na resheniia sentiabr’skogo Plenuma TSK KPSS(s otritsatel’noi storony). No date.). KGB summaries of popular responseswere also devoted to political and foreign affairs. Responses toKhrushchev’s dismissal were surveyed repeatedly, perhaps anxiously, in1964 and 1965, as were rumours of war and responses to conflict in theMiddle East and with China in 1967. On Khrushchev’s dismissal:Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/627, 296-307 (Spravka : o reagirovanii naseleniia vsviazi s soobshcheniem ob osvobozhdenii KHrushcheva ot zanimaemykhpostov. From: Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri SoveteMinistrov Litovskoi SSR A. Randakiavichus. No date.); 308-316 (From:Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov LitovskoiSSR A. Randakiavichus. Date: October 1964); 317-323 (From: Predsedatel’Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR A.
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separation as simply formalizing the typical internal structure of suchreports: First, good news. Then, bad news.Notable, given our interest in the economy, in the sixties as a period oftransitions and reforms, and specifically in the KGB’s analytical capacity,is an investigation of “the work of some enterprises of the Lithuanian SSRin the new conditions of management,” dated May 1968.48 This is morethan the usual collage of canteen gossip; it claims that the KGB “hasstudied the status of productive activity through operative and othermeans.” Still the structure is conventional, opening with two pages ofgood news (one factory has over fulfilled its plan, another has deprivedundisciplined workers of their bonuses, a third has raised output and cutcosts). Then an engineer is quoted on the danger of losing sight of the factthat a person is not just a worker but a “builder of communism.” Thisleads to the “however” we were waiting for:However, in the work of enterprises that have gone over to the newsystem of planning and material incentives, there are also essentialdefects.Some of the defects recounted are either unrelated to the reform orindicate that the reform has not gone very far: they are old stories thatwould have been familiar to any survivor of the 1930s. Several examplesare given of the persistence of “storming,” where the factory is idle in theearly part of the month and most work is done in the last days. The reportblames this on supply shortfalls which, in the new system, areunexpectedly costly. A factory is brought to a halt for lack of a componentworth 60 rubles, as a result of which deliveries worth 60,000 rubles aredelayed and the factory is fined 2,000 rubles for a contract violation. Butthe report also notes the moral hazard here, which is another old story: in
Randakiavichus. Date: oktiabr’ 1964); 324-332 (From: Predsedatel’Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR A.Randakiavichus. Date: oktiabr’ 1964). On foreign affairs and conflicts:Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/655, 30-37 (Spravka. From: Predsedatel’ KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR Iu.Petkiavichius.Date: June 1967); 44-47 (Spravka. From: Predsedatel’ KomitetaGosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR Petkiavichius. Nodate.); 51-54 (From: Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri SoveteMinistrov Litovskoi SSR Iu.Petkiavichius. To: Tsentral’nyi KomitetKommunisticheskoi Partii Litvy. Date: 31 October 1967).
48 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 73-80 (Spravka: o rabote nekotorykhpredpriiatii Litovskoi SSR v novykh usloviiakh khoziaistvovaniia. From:Predsedatel’ Komiteta Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov LitovskoiSSR Petkiavichius. Date: May 1968).
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the Soviet system it’s always convenient to blame the supplier for one’sown inadequacies. And there is high labour turnover, hardly a newphenomenon, which the KGB attributes to the pressure on workersarising from performance evaluation and to poor working conditions.The contemporary nub of concerns about reform is perhaps to befound in a discussion of wage cuts at a textile factory, where two namedemployees are cited as spreading an idea with anti-Soviet implications:The new system is supposedly a fraud and with its help Soviet rulewill not allow the workers the chance to earn more.The last part of the report is devoted to a brief summary of expertopinion. Three people are cited: a lecturer with management experience,a research student, and an academically trained manager. The lecturerpoints out that the recentralization of planning under the industrialministries in Moscow means a loss of authority for Lithuania’sgovernment and plan agency. The research student criticizes thecontinuing lack of salary incentives to stay in college and acquire aprofessional training. The manager thinks planning would be associatedwith better incentives if the government would commit to longer termquotas and contracts of three to five years, rather than revising themevery year. (But these are all old issues; it’s just that the 1965 reformseither left them untouched or, in the case of regional authority, reinstatedthe old system.) There the report stops abruptly; there is no conclusion orsummative evaluation.A common feature of KGB reports was the near absence of a “bottomline,” such as might have been represented by an executive summary orchecklist of action points. In rare cases when conclusions were reached,they were generally limited to statements of the obvious or reinforcementof what was already known.The Alec Nove test was whether the KGB was interested in theenterprise wage fund. A key issue in economic reforms was whether thefinancial constraint on the wage fund should be hard or soft. Tosummarize our evidence on this aspect, the KGB showed no interest inthis issue; there is little sign that the KGB even understood it. As itsresponses to economic emergencies have demonstrated, the KGB wasinterested in the issue only if hardening the wage fund constraintthreatened economic disruption, in a context where the smallestdisruption could signal the foreign enemy directly or indirectly at work.
8. Discussion: Regulation and human capitalA standard approach to the economics of market regulation is to seek toregulate up to the point where the difference between regulatory benefits
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and burdens is maximized (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington 2005, p. 9).The benefits flow to the consumer, and arise from limiting market power,enforcing market transparency, and preventing discrimination. Thenthere are the costs. Direct costs are the resources consumed by theregulator, and these are met by the taxpayer. Often more important arethe indirect burdens on producers and consumers that arise becauseregulated firms face higher costs of compliance (or avoidance or evasion).The conventional approach is sometimes criticized because it ignoresthe political aspect of regulation. Political authorities often use regulationto serve multiple (and hidden) objectives that go far beyond consumerwelfare. Because of this, as Dieter Helm (2006) has pointed out,“Economics can illustrate the costs and benefits of intervention, but notthe desirability.”The regulatory role of the KGB that emerges from our description wasstrikingly different from that assumed conventionally. The purpose of theKGB in the Soviet command economy was to forestall disruption of theplans of an authoritarian regime. It worked to enforce secrecy, monopoly,and discrimination, in other words, taking a direction exactly opposite tothe competition, transparency, and non-discrimination promoted bymarket regulators in liberal democracies.While distributing benefits to the regime, KGB regulation was costly.Costs were both direct and indirect. Based on the records of the regulator,we can show only the direct costs. The KGB was a small organization,employing one per thousand of the Soviet Lithuanian workforce, so thedirect costs of KGB regulation were small. While the KGB was small,related research (Harrison 2013b) has suggested that costs to the KGB
itself of adhering to its own standards of secrecy were very substantial. Ifthe facilities that the KGB regulated faced similar costs, then indirectburdens on the economy would be similarly substantial. But here wespeculate. Only the records of the regulated facilities and organizationscan reveal the scale of indirect costs and their trends over time.To add a necessary complication, the literature on regulation inmarket economies recognizes that the regulator is likely to know less thanthe firm that is being regulated. The result may be unintendedconsequences. When regulation fails to recognize the ignorance of theregulator, firms can be incentivized to raise costs, dilute quality, or fail toinvest in necessary infrastructure. Analysis of the differences ininformation held by firms and regulators suggests how to design efficientregulatory policies in the presence of this asymmetry (Armstrong andSappington 2007).Transferring these ideas to the Soviet context we might think of KGBregulation of personnel selection as a mechanism that changed theincentives of both firms and employees. The KGB administration of
43
security clearance impeded the capacity of firms to select and promotequalified personnel. In order to avoid difficulties and delays, firms wouldhave had an incentive to promote personnel on known loyalty beforeknown competence.This would be bad enough if loyalty and incompetence wereorthogonally distributed. It would be worse if they were correlated.Egorov and Sonin (2011) have considered the loyalty-competence trade-off under a dictator who values competence, but fears the challenge ofenemies and betrayal by his nearest supporters, and fears them more, themore competent they are. For this reason, Egorov and Sonin write,“loyalty and incompetence are two sides of the same token.”It seems highly likely that KGB regulation of the market for managersdid long-term damage to the supply side of the Soviet economy. It turnedthe personal acquisition of skills and qualifications into a highly uncertaininvestment, because no one could be sure that some marker for disloyaltywould not then be found in their past and used to deny promotion. Toavoid the risk of exposure of dubious personal or family histories,employees would have had incentives to avoid acquiring the skills andcompetences that would put them in line for promotion. KGB control ofpromotion made a quiet life in a low-skill, low-wage environmentpreferable to seeking distinction and risking the scrutiny that wouldinevitably follow.An implication is that human capital accumulation in the Sovietsociety suffered from adverse selection. The Polish economist
Włodzimerz Brus (1975, p. 200) came to the same conclusion from personal experience, describing the tendency to “negative selection” ofpersonnel under communism for “servility and conformity.”There is no evidence, however, that the KGB was even slightlyinterested in the economic costs or unintended economic consequences ofits counter-intelligence role. Here was something no one needed to know.
ConclusionsWhy should economists and economic historians pay attention to theKGB? A short answer is that the KGB paid a great deal of attention to theeconomy. Why and how it did so and with what results are all questions oflegitimate scholarly interest. These are questions, moreover, that werehard to answer until now, and have rarely (if ever) been posed.We have shown that KGB counter-intelligence had potentiallyimportant economic functions and effects. The KGB had a permanentpresence in the core facilities of the economy through its officers andagents. Its purpose was to frustrate the hostile forces seeking to penetrateand intervene in Soviet society and to forestall the disruption that they
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sought to bring about. The KGB limited the flow of correspondence andcontrolled access to information. It monitored the loyalty of the workforceand enforced discrimination in the selection and promotion of personnel.It intervened in situations involving discipline and conflict.KGB counter-intelligence imposed regulatory burdens on the Sovieteconomy. To the extent that previous scholarship has ignored thecounter-intelligence function, it has also neglected the burdens. KGBrecords give us ample evidence that the burdens existed, but do not tell ushow large they were. For this, further research is needed in the records ofthe enterprises and organizations that were regulated by the KGB.The same past neglect of the counter-intelligence function in thecommand economy may have led to understatement of the extent towhich design features of the economy such as its forms of centralizationand hierarchy were tailored to internal security objectives. Recentadvances in Soviet economic history have emphasized the need to takeexternal security seriously as a goal of the planned economy. We think thesame should be said about internal security.At the same time, if the economy was designed to meet the needs ofcounter-intelligence, there is little evidence that design was intelligent.We find no evidence that the Lithuania KGB was active in articulatingwhat economic goals or reforms would best meet the needs of internalsecurity. It showed no concern for unintended consequences. In themarket for talent, KGB regulation weakened or inverted selection oncompetence and discouraged the talented from acquiring skills. There isno sign that the KGB thought about such wider social costs.The KGB was the party’s instrument, not its brain. Whether the brainwas hidden somewhere else in the system, or had withered away, or hadever existed is another story.
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Figures
Figure 1. Lithuania: towns and borders
Source: Google Maps (accessed 21 July 2013). The names of neighbouringterritories are added.
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Figure 2. The Baltic KGBs, 1953 to 1984: the local nationality gap
Source: Appendix table A-1.Notes:The “local nationality gap” is the percent share of local nationals in theKGB workforce, less their percent share in the resident population in the1959 census.In the Soviet Union, national identity (e.g. Russian, Estonian) was self-declared for purposes of acquiring personal identity papers and innational censuses. We suppose that the Estonian and Latvian KGB figureswere based on self-declaration. For Lithuania the KGB figures are basedon the ethnic identification of family names given in holiday rosters andcirculation lists found in KGB files.For Estonia and Latvia, the data points span the entire RepublicanKGB. For Lithuania, they are based on much smaller KGB subunits(specific departments of the second administration).
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Figure 3. Structure of KGB counter-intelligence in Soviet Lithuania, 1967 to
1975(A) 1960 to September 1967 (B) September 1967 to March 1975
Sources: Anušauskas (2008) and “Kontržvalgyba” (Counter-intelligence)at http://www.kgbveikla.lt/lt/kontrzvalgyba, accessed 28 May 2013.Key:Department Counter-intelligence focusFirst Foreign intelligence agencies, military facilities, andborder zonesSecond Domestic anti-Soviet networksThird Industrial, transport, and research facilities and personnelFourth Penetration and disruption of hostile networksFifth Ideological matters
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Figure 4. Employment in facilities regulated by the Lithuania KGB second
administration, and in the Lithuania public sector: 1960 to 1971, selected
years
Source: Regulated facilities, from Appendix Table A-5; public sector fromTsSU (1961, p. 638; 1972, p. 601).Notes: Figures in brackets are annual average growth rates taking firstand last years of each series. Regulated non-industrial facilities are intransport, communication, and trade facilities and fisheries. Clearancesare for “secret” correspondence and above.
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Figure 5. Facilities regulated by the Lithuania KGB second administration,
June 1968, by city and type of facility
Source: For the complete list of 107 regulated facilities see AppendixTable A-6. Cities are ranked from left to right in declining order ofresident populations according to the 1970 Soviet census, based onAppendix Table A-7. Categories are ranked from top to bottom indeclining order of their relative frequency in the capital Vilnius, as definedin Table 10.
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Tables
Table 1. Persons linked to the West under Lithuania KGB supervision, 1960s
(annual average) 1961 to 1965 1967 to 1971
Residents of Lithuania:With foreign correspondents or familytiesa 525,000 …Travelling to capitalist and developingcountries 1,004 4,437Of which, via sporting, cultural, andscientific exchanges … 176
Visitors to Lithuania:From capitalist and developingcountries 12,327 13,877Of which, via sporting, cultural, andscientific exchanges … 181Source: Taken or calculated from Anušauskas (2008, p. 71). Figures areannual averages based on alternate years within the period shown, unlessnoted otherwise.Note:a 1961.
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Table 2. Lithuania KGB employees, 1960s (annual average)1961 to 1965 1967 to 1971Employees, total 1,183 1,198Of which:Second administration 132 85Fifth department … 57Subtotal 132 143Local departments 415 401Other departments 635 655Source: Calculated from Appendix Table A-2.Note. There were 36 local departments in 1961 to 1965, and 28 in1967 to 1971. "Other" departments: the fifth, seventh, operational-technical, and investigative departments, the information and analysissubdivision, and the secretariat.
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Table 3. The Lithuania KGB agent network, 1960s (annual average)1961 to 1965 1967 to 1971Agents 3,354 3,982Trusted persons 3,413 6,286Total 6,767 10,267Of which:Second administrationand fifth department 1,297 2,031Local departments 5,413 8,162Other departments 57 74Source: Calculated from Appendix Table A-3. On local departments seeTable 3. “Other departments” are the residual.
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Table 4. The density of agent networks: selected regions and yearsSovietUnion SovietLithuania EastGermany(1935) (1970) (1991)Resident population, millions 159.2 3.1 15.9State security employees and informers,thousands 500 12.0 270Agents per thousand 3.1 3.8 17.0Sources: Populations, for the Soviet Union, the average of figures for 1January 1935 and 1936 from Andreev, Darskii, and Khar’kova (1993, p.118); Soviet Lithuania, the census figure for 15 January 1970 from TsSU(1970, p. 10); East Germany, the mid- 1991 figure from The ConferenceBoard Total Economy Database January 2013, at http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ (accessed 9 June 2013).State security employees and informers, for the Soviet Union, Shearer(2009, p. 136); for Soviet Lithuania, totals of employees, agents, andtrusted persons averaged over 1969 and 1971 from Appendix Tables A-2and A-3; for East Germany, Bruce (2012, p. 10).
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Table 5. Lithuania KGB third department officers’ education level, 1977Number PercentDoctor of technical sciences 1 1%Candidate of science 17 14%Higher (university) education 77 62%Incomplete higher education 7 6%Secondary Education 22 18%Source: Compiled from figures given by Grybkauskas (2009, p. 100.)
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Table 6. Lithuania KGB case-load indicators, 1960s (annual average)1961 to 1965 1967 to 1971
Total:Alerts of operational significance … 2,531Cases under investigation 1,592 1,183Persons under investigation 1,601 1,213Persons prosecuted 40 35
Per 100 employees:Alerts of operational significance … 211Cases under investigation 135 99Persons under investigation 135 101Persons prosecuted 3.4 2.9
Per 100 agents and trusted persons:Alerts of operational significance … 25Cases under investigation 24 12Persons under investigation 24 12Persons prosecuted 0.6 0.3Source: Totals (first four rows) are calculated from Appendix Table A-4.Other figures are normalized by employees, agents, and trusted persons,on the basis of Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3.
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Table 7. Persons identified by agents and trusted persons in facilities of
industry, transport, and communications in Lithuania, 1968 NumberPreviously convicted of state crimes 409Returned from special settlements 336Repatriated or re-emigrated 33German collaborators or served in the German police orarmed forces or punitive units 23In contact with foreign sailors and foreigners 45In correspondence with relatives living in capitalist countries 711Visited capitalist and developing countries as specialists 79Visited capitalist countries as tourists 13Visited capitalist countries privately 13Visited the Polish People’s Republic privately 119Legalized [former] bandits and Soviet Army deserters 6Sectarians, Baptists, etc. 26Convicted of criminal and other offenses 62Persons with close relatives against whom there iscompromising evidence 69Persons meriting attention of the organs of state security forvarious reasons 49Source: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 154-167 (Spravka. From: Nachal’nik 3otdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri SM Litovskoi SSR – podpolkovnik Akimov.Date: 19 November 1968). Row headings are ordered as in the original.The sum of the rows is 1,993 persons.
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Table 8. Facilities regulated by the Lithuania KGB second administration,
1960s (annual average) 1961 to 1965 1967 to 1971Facilities “of special importance” 7 9In which, employees 6,607 13,438Of which, cleared for documentationclassified “secret” or higher 1,889 3,564Facilities “of national economicimportance” 116 111In which, employees 61,490 102,981Transport, communication, and tradefacilities and fisheries 21 27In which, employees 56,006 67,275Source: Calculated from Appendix Table A-5. Figures are annual averagesbased on alternate years within the period shown.
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Table 9. Closed factories: Lithuania, January 1978Full name: Mailbox no.
Vilnius1. Research Institute of Electrography G-46022. Vilnius Design Bureau G-4322Factory of the Vilnius Design Bureau V-22603. Vilnius Research Institute for Radar Instruments R-68564. Radar Instrument Factory A-78595. Vilnius Radio Components Factory A-71286. Lithuanian Instrumentation Factory A-79347. Vilnius Design Bureau for Magnetic Recording A-3593
Kaunas1. Kaunas Radio Factory and Design Bureau A-16792. Kaunas Research Institute for Radar Equipment[KNIIRIT] V-85743. Factory of KNIIRIT A-1679
Šiauliai1. Šiauliai “Nuklon” Factory M-5621Source: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/748, 15 (Spisok zakrytykh predpriiatii. Date:23 January 1978). Numbering is as in the original.
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Table 10. KGB-regulated facilities in five towns of Soviet Lithuania, 1968:
relative frequency by location and category.
Allfaci
lities
Econom
ic
regulat
ors
Science
-based
facilitie
s
Locatio
n-base
d
activiti
es
Netwo
rk
utilitie
s
Heavy
industr
y
plantsVilnius 1.6 4.2 2.2 1.3 1.1 0.6Kaunas 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.0 1.5 0.0
Klaipėda 1.8 0.0 0.7 3.5 1.5 3.2
Šiauliai 2.4 0.0 1.5 1.9 3.7 2.4
Panevėžys 1.4 0.0 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.0Source: Calculated from Appendix Tables A-6 and A-7.Notes: In Soviet Lithuania in 1970, 1,571,737 civilians lived in 115urban locations, as listed in Appendix Table A-7. The table shows theproportions of KGB-regulated facilities in each category that are found ineach town, divided by the proportion of urban residents that lived there
in 1970. Five facilities in four smaller towns (Kėdainiai, Jonava, Mažeikiai, 
and Elektrėnai) are included in the calculation but are not shown in the table because at low absolute frequencies results are dominated by zeros
and ones. No town larger than Panevėžys is omitted from the table. 
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Table 11. Agents and alerts received by the Lithuania KGB second
administration, third department, Kaunas and Panevėžys, 1969 Kaunas PanevėžysFacilities under supervision … 10Agents 97 23Safe-house holders 13Trusted persons … 65Of which, providing alerts:Agents 31 6Trusted persons 27 9Other sources 17 9Alerts, total 75 24Of which:Anti-Soviet expressions and propaganda 24 11Suspicious contact with foreigners 16 …Suspected illegal firearms 11 2Suspected secrecy violations 6 3Suspected treason 6 …Suspected spies and state criminals 4 …Industrial accidents 4 …Suspected anti-Soviet activity 3 …Attempts to send slanderous informationabroad 1 …Disorganization and “negative phenomena” incollectives … 4Threats to disrupt production … 2Suspected false identification papers … 2Sources: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 164-167 (Dokladnaia zapiska. From:Zam nachal’nika Panevezhskogo GO KGB pri Sovete Ministrov LitovskoiSSR podpolkovnik F. Volkov. To: Nachal’niku 3 otdela 2 upravleniia KGBpri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR kapitanu tovarishchu Morkunasu E.B.Date: 4 December 1969); Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/668, 168-191 (Spravka: orezul’tatakh raboty 3-go otdeleniia za 1969 god. From: Nachal’nik 3 otd-iaKaunasskogo gorotdela KGB pri SM Lit. SSR – maior Trukhachev. Date: 9December 1969).
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Table 12. Kompromat in two dimensions: Panevėžys, December 1972 Circumstantialevidence Voluntaryhostile action TotalHistorical 167 55 222Contemporaneous 65 34 99Total 232 89 321Source: As Appendix Table A-8. Units of measurement are instances ofcompromising information held by the KGB and distributed over the 176persons covered in Table A-8.
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Table 13. Kompromat and the compromised: Panevėžys, December 1972 Contemporaneous hostile action? Yes No DifferenceTotal 34 142 …
Personal dataProb. Russian 0% 1% -1%Prob. Female 47% 39% 8%Average age 1944 21.9 19.7 2.11Standard deviation 12.4 12.8 …Average years education 8.3 10.1 -1.81Standard deviation 4.8 4.4 …Prob. Party or Komsomol 15% 6% 8%
Labour market statusProb. Employed 79% 86% -7%Prob. WC/Supervisor | Employed 59% 77% -17%Prob. Retired 15% 10% 4%Prob. Housewife 6% 4% 2%
Nature of compromising evidenceProb. Historical circumstances:Personal 12% 18% -7%Of family member 3% 7% -4%Prob. Liable to resettlement:Personally 3% 6% -3%As family member 6% 19% -13%Of family members 3% 8% -5%Prob. Historical behaviour:Personally 9% 15% -6%By family member 15% 35% -20%Prob. Sentenced:Personally 3% 21% -18%Family member 9% 13% -5%Prob. Current circumstances:Personally 12% 6% 6%Family member abroad 44% 24% 20%Prob. Current behaviour:Personal 100% 0% 100%By family member 6% 1% 4%Source: As Appendix Table A-8. “WC” = white collar.
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Data Appendix
Figure A-1. Structure of the KGB in Soviet Lithuania, 1954 to 1991
Source: This translates a similar figure from Lietuvos gyventojų genocido 
ir rezistencijos tyrimo centras, “LSSR KGB struktūra,” available at http://www.kgbveikla.lt/lt/lssr-kgb-struktura (accessed 24 April 2013).
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Table A-1. KGBs and census populations: per cent of local nationalityKGB employees Census populationsEstonia1953a 25 …1959b … 74.6Latvia1953c 17.5 …1956d 44 …1958d 55 …1959b … 62.0Lithuania, second administration1957e 53 …1959b … 79.31968f 39 (first dept) …1969g 23 (third dept) …1969h 44 (first dept) …1970j 44 (first dept) 80.11971k 53 (first dept) …1973m 77 (fifth dept) …1979n … 80.01984e 75 …Note on Lithuania: All figures are for the KGB second administration onlyand for particular departments shown. They are based on the ethnicidentification of family names given in holiday rosters and circulationlists. The KGB did not have unified personnel records; eachadministration had its own card index.Sources:a Estimate provided by Meelis Saueauk (personal correspondence, 29April 2013). According to Tannberg (2010, p. 000) the same figure foremployees of the Estonia MVD (including both state security and militia atthat time) was 32 per cent.b TsSU (1961, pp. 18-20).c Rahi-Tamm, Jansons, and Kaasik (2010, p. 000).d Persak and Kamiński (2010, p. 162-163). e Anušauskas (2008, p. 87).f Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/659, 237-239 (Grafik otpuskov sotrudnikov 1-gootdela 2 upravleniia KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR na 1968 g.From first department chief Lt-Col Kardanovskii. 3 January 1968).g Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/670, 17 (Grafik otpuskov operativnogo sostava3 otdela 2-go upravleniia KGB pri SM Lit. SSR na 1969 g. From third
department chief Capt. Markūnas. 15 January 1969.  h Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/683, 102-104 (Grafik otpuskov sotrudnikov 1otdela 2 Upravleniia KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Lit. SSR na 1970 god. Fromfirst department chief Lt-Col A. Kardanovskii. Date: 30 December 1969).
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j Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/673, 24 (Spisok sotrudnikov 1 otdela 2upravleniia KGB pri SM LSSR oznakomlennykh s prikazami, ukazaniiamiKGB pri SM Soiuza SSR i KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Lit. SSR ot 13.02.70 g.).For an identical list see also Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/683, 105-106 (Grafikotpuskov sotrudnikov 1 otdela 2 Upravleniia KGB pri Sovete MinistrovLitovskoi SSR na 1969 god. From first department chief Lt-Col A.Kardanovskii. Date: 27 January 1969). For 1970 census data see TsSU(1972, p. 594).k Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/683, 100-101 (Grafik otpuskov sotrudnikov 1otdela 2 Upravleniia KGB pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR na 1971 god.From first department deputy chief Lt-Col A. Domarkas. Date: 15 January1971).m Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/699, 157 (Spisok sotrudnikov 5 otdela KGB priSM Lit. SSR oznakomlennykh s prikazami KGB pri SM Lit. SSR za 1973 g.).n TsSU (1982, p. 36).
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Table A-2. Lithuania KGB employees, 1961 to 19711961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971Total 1,181 1,185 1,182 1,187 … …Of the total, by status:Servicemen 653 658 658 658 660 670Officers and NCOs 169 169 170 170 170 203Civilians 359 358 354 359 359 346Of the total, by section:Second administration 130 132 135 87 86 83Fifth department 57 59 56Seventh department 171 171 170 170 169 176Operational-technical 200 200 200 202 203 203Investigative 23 26 26 26 26 26Information andanalysis subdivision … … … … … 6Secretariat 28 28 28 29 29 29In local departments 419 414 413 401 401 401Number of localdepartments 36 36 36 28 28 28Source: Anušauskas (2008, p. 43).
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Table A-3. Lithuania KGB agents and “trusted persons” and their affiliation,
1961-1971 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971Agents 2,904 3,453 3,705 3,800 3,963 4,182Of which:Second administration 732 806 822 536 515 555Fifth department … … … 311 391 389Seventh department 42 53 67 71 74 66Operative-technical 2 3 4 4 4 4Local departments 2,128 2,591 2,812 2,878 2,979 3,168Trusted persons 2,531 3,401 4,307 5,327 6,039 7,491Of which:Second administration 410 487 635 721 766 832Fifth department … … … 283 354 440Local departments 2,121 2,914 3,672 4,323 4,919 6,219Source: Anušauskas (2008, p. 88, 94).
73
Table A-4. Lithuania KGB surveillance and investigations, 1961 to 19711961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971Verified alertsof operationalsignificance … … … 2,259 2,547 2,786Cases underinvestigation 1,894 1,789 1,094 1,191 1,170 1,189Persons underinvestigation 1,912 1,795 1,095 1,193 1,215 1,231Personsprosecuted 56 45 18 32 41 31Source: Anušauskas (2008, p. 71).
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Table A-5. Industrial facilities under Lithuania KGB supervision, 1961 to
1971 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971Regulated facilities“of specialimportance” 6 7 7 8 10 10In which, numberemployees 4,914 6,621 8,286 10,314 13,730 16,270Of which, clearedfor documentationclassified “secret”or higher 1,661 2,121 1,886 2,742 3,632 4,318Regulated facilities“of nationaleconomicimportance” 107 120 120 110 112 112In which,employees 42,730 60,710 81,031 91,578 105,496 111,870Regulatedtransport,communication,and trade facilitiesand fisheries 20 20 22 24 26 31In which,employees 50,520 57,394 60,105 63,667 66,566 71,592Source: Anušauskas (2008, p. 71).
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Table A-6. Facilities regulated by the Lithuania KGB second administration,
June 1968Facility Fundholder Key
VilniusPlanning Commission [Gosplan] LSSR CM EState Bank [Gosbank] LSSR CM EMin. of Communications LSSR CM NMin. of Land Amelioration and WaterConservation (including theInstitute of Water Conservation) LSSR CM LMin. of Automobile Transport andRoads LSSR CM NChief Admin. of Power andElectrification LSSR CM NChief Admin. of Material and TechnicalSupply LSSR CM NAdmin. of Geology LSSR CM LLithuanian Admin. of Civil Aviation USSR Min. of CivilAviation NAdmin. of Land Reorganization LSSR Min. of Agriculture LVilnius District Admin. of Gas Pipelines USSR Min. of GasIndustry NCentral Statistical Admin. LSSR CM EResearch Institute of Electrography(mailbox G-4602). Does researchand experimental design work onmanufacture of display equipment,computer output devices, anddocument copiers.
USSR Min. of RadioIndustry S
Research Institute of RadarInstruments (mailbox R-6856).Develops new models of radarinstruments.
USSR Min. of RadioIndustry S
Vilnius branch of the All-UnionResearch Institute ofElectrowelding Equipment USSR Min. ofElectrotechnical Industry SRepublican Design Institute for LandOrganization [LSSR] Min. ofAgriculture LInstitute of Geology LSSR CM Admin. ofGeology L
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Facility Fundholder KeyAssociation “Sigma,” with CentralDesign Bureau of ManagementSystems and “Orgtekhnika”Specialized Design Bureau.Develops and prepares accountingand organization equipment.
USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Vilnius Design Bureau (mailbox no. G-4322). Does research andexperimental design work onmodel integrated circuits andspecial-purpose equipment
USSR Min. of theElectronic Industry S
Vilnius Design Bureau of MagneticRecording (mailbox no. A-3593).Develops sound recordingequipment for Ministry of Defencecontrast and also for needs of thenational economy.
USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry S
Special Design Bureau of theAccounting Equipment Factory.Develops discrete choiceequipment [schetno-reshaiushchieustroistva]
USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Experimental Research Institute formetal Cutting machine tools.Develops and improvesmetalworking machine tools
USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Vilnius Radar Instrument Factory(mailbox V-7859). Produces radarequipment for military purposes USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry SLithuanian Instrumentation Factory(mailbox A-7934). Prepares soundrecording equipment for Ministryof Defence contrast and also forneeds of the national economy.
USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry S
Radio Components Factory (mailboxno. A-7528). Producestransformers for the defenceindustry and also transformers anddeflection systems for televisionsets
USSR Min. of theElectronic Industry S
Vilnius Electrowelding EquipmentFactory (mailbox G-4823) USSR Min. of theElectrotechnical Industry S
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Facility Fundholder KeyVilnius Electrotechnical Factory “Elfa”(mailbox A-7586). Producescompact electrical motors andmagnetic recorders for needs of thenational economy
USSR Min. of theElectrotechnical Industry S
Vilnius Factory of Electrical Meters USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Vilnius Factory of NumericallyControlled Machine Tools (mailboxno. V-2677) USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Vilnius Factory of AccountingEquipment USSR Min. of InstrumentBuilding, Means ofAutomation, andManagement Systems
S
Machine Tool Factory “Žalgiris”(mailbox no. V-2936) USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Factory of Building and FinishingMachinery USSR Min. of Buildingand Road Engineering HMachine Tool Factory “Kommunaras” USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrumentationIndustry
S
Vilnius Power Grid LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NVilnius Thermal Power Central LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NVilnius oil depot LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NDOSAAF Republican committee [USSR DOSAAF] LCivil Defence Staff LSSR [CM] LUnified Air Detachment and VilniusAirport USSR Min. of CivilAviation, LithuanianAdmin. L
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Facility Fundholder KeyVilnius division and lines: Vilnius-Porech’e-Druskininkai, Vilnius-Stasiliai, Vilnius-Turmantas,Vilnius-Šumskas, and Lentvaris-Kaišiadorys
Baltic Railway N
KaunasKaunas Research Institute for RadarEquipment [KNIIRIT] (mailbox no.V-8574). Does exploratory researchon ways and means of creating newradar equipment for Ministry ofDefence contracts and needs of thenational economy
USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry S
Institute for Physical-TechnicalProblems of Power Engineering.Does development work on varioussecret topics in new powerengineering, high-temperaturephysics and cybernetics
LSSR Academy ofSciences S
Republican Institute for Design ofWater Supply “Litgiprovodkhoz” LSSR Min. of Agriculture NInstitute for Industrial ConstructionDesign “Promproekt” [LSSR CM StateConstruction Admin.]“Gosstroi” SKaunas Geodesical, Cartographic, andLand-Organization Departments. Republican DesignInstitute for LandOrganization [of theLSSR Min. of Agriculture]
L
Specialized Administration of RoadBuilding LSSR Min. of RoadTransport and Highways NSpecialized Design Bureau “Vint”(mailbox no. A-1281). Engages inthe development of screwpropellers for Ministry of Defencecontracts
USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry S
Naval Engineering Factory “Piargale”(mailbox no. A-7475). Producesscrew propellers for Ministry ofDefence contracts
USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry S
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Facility Fundholder KeyKaunas Radio Factory (mailbox R-6856) and Specialized DesignBureau USSR Min. of the RadioIndustry SArtificial Textile Fibre Factory LSSR CM Admin. of theChemical Industry SKaunas “Kaunas Energoremont”[Power Repair] Enterprise USSR Min. of Power andElectrification NLithuanian Office for Woodland AerialPhotography All-Union “Lesproekt”Association L“Vodokanal” [Water Supply] Trust LSSR Min. of CommunalServices NWestern Aerial-PhotographyGeodesical Enterprise“Sel’khozaerofots”emka” USSR Min. of Agriculture LKaunas State Power station andPetrashus State District PowerStation LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NKaunas zonal base of “Glavneftesbyt”[Oil Supply Administration] LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NLithuanian Admin. Airport and UnifiedAir Squadron of USSR Min. of CivilAviation NAir Club and Radio Club DOSAAF LKaunas communications office, securecommunications division, and cityand inter-city telephone exchanges LSSR Min. ofCommunications NRadio station and facility no. 603 LSSR Min. ofCommunications NThird district of the cable relayturnpike. Maintains lines ofcommunication, including thosegoing to important secure facilitiesand the international cable
USSR Min. ofCommunications N
Kaunas city and district civil defencestaffs [LSSR CM] LKaunas city railway station and lines:
Kaišiadorys-Linkaičiai, Kaišiadorys-
Kaunas, Palemonas-Gaižūnai, 
Kaunas-Kybartai, Kazlų Rūda-Alytus
Baltic Railway N
Šiauliai
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Facility Fundholder Key
Šiauliai television factory (mailbox no.V-3822) Min. of the RadioIndustry SElectronics factory “Nuklon” (mailbox.No. M-5621). The factory ispresently under construction. Aftercommissioning, the factory willproduce integrated logical circuitsfor Ministry of Defence contracts
Min. of the ElectronicsIndustry S
Šiauliai precision machine tools factory USSR Min. of MachineTool Building and theInstrument Industry SBicycle and Motor Factory “Vairus” USSR Min. of theAutomobile Industry HOil depot LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NLand organization base Republican DesignInstitute for LandOrganization [of theLSSR Min. of Agriculture]
L
West-Lithuania HydrogeologicalExpedition LSSR CM Admin. ofGeology LPower grid LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NState District Power Station “Rekiva” LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NGas Supply Administration LSSR Min. of CommunalServices NWater Supply Administration LSSR Min. of theCommunal Economy NSpecialized Road BuildingAdministration, production unit LSSR Min. of RoadTransport and Highways NDistrict network, with facilities: TVrelay station, telephone exchange[lineino-tekhnicheskii uzel], facilityno. 60, secure communicationfacility [spetssviaz’], cable unit no.33
Min. of Communication N
Civil Defence Staff [LSSR CM] L
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Facility Fundholder KeyRailways of the Šiauliai division andlines: Šiauliai-Eglaine, Radviliškis-
Pagėgiai, Šiauliai-Lukšiai, and 
Šiauliai-[illegible]
Baltic Railway N
Klaipėda
Klaipėda Shipbuilding Factory “Baltiia” (mailbox no. N-5832) USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry HExperimental Ship Repair Factory(mailbox no. V-2677) USSR Min. of Fisheries SWorkshop no. 2 (mailbox no. 109) ofthe Riga Enterprise “Era”. Engagesin electrical installation work onvessels of the fishing fleet andNavy.
USSR Min. of theShipbuilding Industry S
Ship Repair Factory no. 7 USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet H
Klaipėda division of the State Design Institute of the Fishing Fleet USSR Min. of Fisheries L
Klaipėda trading port USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet L
Klaipėda Maritime Agency USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet LRadio facility no. 61. Engages injamming radio broadcasts ofcapitalist states LSSR Min. ofCommucations N
Klaipėda oil export entrepôt LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NBases USSR Min. of Fisheries L
Klaipėda Seafaring College USSR Min. of Fisheries LCoastal Weather Station USSR Min. of theMaritime Fleet LCity Communications Network LSSR Min. ofCommucations NPower Grid and State District PowerStation LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification NCivil Defence Staff [LSSR CM] LDOSAAF [USSR DOSAAF] L
Klaipėda railway network and lines: 
Klaipėda-Skuodas, Kretinga-Kužiai, 
and Klaipėda-Pagėgiai 
Baltic Railway N
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Facility Fundholder Key
PanevėžysEkranas Cathode Ray Tube Factory(mailbox no. V-2963) USSR Min. of theElectronics Industry SAutomobile Compressor Factory USSR Min. of theAutomobile Industry SPrecision Mechanical Factory.Produces visual-display accountingequipment Sigma Association S
Panevėžys oil depot LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofMaterial and TechnicalSupply NCity DOSAAF and Civil Aviation landingstrip [USSR DOSAAF] LCity and District Civil Defence Staffs [LSSR CM] LDistrict communications network LSSR Min. ofCommucations N
MažeikiaiCompressor Factory USSR Min. of Engineeringfor the Light and FoodIndustry and HouseholdEquipment
S
Akmenė Cement Factory LSSR Min. of BuildingMaterials H
Elektrėnai
Elektrėnai State District Power Station LSSR CM Chief Admin. ofPower and Electrification N
Kėdainiai
Kėdainiai Chemical Combine LSSR CM Admin. of theChemical Industry. H
Jonava:Nitrogenous Fertilizer Factory LSSR CM Admin. of theChemical Industry. HSource: The words in the first two columns are abstracted fromHoover/LYA, K-1/3/664, 120-132 (Spisok uchrezhdenii, organizatsii ipredpriiatii Litovskoi SSR na kotorykh neobkhodimo provodit’kontrrazvedyvatel’nuiu rabotu 2-m Upravleniem Komitetomgosbezopasnosti pri SM Lit. SSR. From: Nachal’nik 2 upravleniia Komiteta
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Gosbezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Lit SSR – polkovnik Naras. Date: 18June 1968). Text in [square brackets] is inserted. The third column is ourattribution, based on the key below.Key: Definition Scope of activityE Economic regulators Accounting, planning, and financial servicesH Heavy industryfacilities Shipyards, fertilizer plants, and otherproduction without a clear research ordevelopmental orientationL Location-basedactivities Ports, airports, civil defence and bordersecurity, and activities linked to resourceexploitation involving cartography andaerial photographyN Network utilities Power, gas, and water supplies, railways,highways, mail and cable services.S Science-basedresearch orproduction Research, development, testing, andexperimental facilities and electronicproducts.Abbreviations:DOSAAF Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force,and NavyLSSR Lithuanian Soviet Socialist RepublicCM Council of MinistersMin. MinistryAdmin. Administration (usually a functional or territorial subdivisionof a ministry)
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Table A-7. The urban population of Lithuania, 1970Urban district Population1. Vilnius 372,1002. Birštonas 2,2283. Druskininkai 11,1604. Kaunas 305,1165. Klaipėda 140,0126. Giruliai (urban settlement) 7117. Neringa 1,9448. Palanga 8,7979. Panevėžys 73,32810. Šiauliai 93,057
Akmenė district11. Naujoji Akmenė (district centre) 10,17512. Akmenė 2,49913. Viekšniai (urban settlement) 2,731
Alytus district14. Alytus (district centre) 28,07415. Daugai 1,53016. Simnas 1,709
Anykščiai district17. Anykščiai (district centre) 8,23818. Kavarskas 1,25619. Troškūnai 1,434
Biržai district20. Biržai (district centre) 11,38521. Vabalninkas 2,06322. Likėnai (urban settlement) 656
Varėna district23. Varėna (district centre) 4,494
Vilkaviškis district24. Vilkaviškis (district centre) 8,56625. Virbalis 1,48726. Kybartai 6,430
Vilnius district27. Nemenčinė 3,208
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Urban district Population
Zarasai district28. Zarasai (district centre) 6,60529. Dusetos 1,57830. Antalieptė (urban settlement) 63631. Turmantas (urban settlement) 578
Ignalina district32. Ignalina (district centre) 3,51533. Dūkštas 1,502
Jonava district34. Jonava (district centre) 14,438
Joniškis district35. Joniškis (district centre) 7,52236. Žagarė 3,381
Kaišiadorys district37. Kaišiadorys (district centre) 4,70138. Žiežmariai (urban settlement) 1,733
Kapsukas district39. Kapsukas (district centre) 28,76340. Kazlų Rūda 4,39741. Kalvarija 5,600
Kaunas district42. Vilkija 2,27743. Garliava (urban settlement) 5,58744. Kačerginė (urban settlement) 59845. Kulautuva (urban settlement) 1,91646. Linksmakalnis (urban settlement) 20947. Ežerėlis (urban settlement) 2,110
Kėdainiai district48. Kėdainiai (district centre) 19,67749. Dotnuva 1,212
Kelmė district50. Kelmė (district centre) 7,08751. Tytuvėnai 3,145
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Urban district Population52. Užventis 1,406
Klaipėda district53. Gargždai (district centre) 6,41454. Priekulė 1,853
Kretinga district55. Kretinga (district centre) 13,09156. Salantai 2,156
Kupiškis district57. Kupiškis (district centre) 4,87658. Subačius (urban settlement) 1,365
Lazdijai district59. Lazdijai (district centre) 3,92860. Veisiejai 1,463
Mažeikiai district61. Mažeikiai (district centre) 13,46862. Seda 1,822
Molėtai district63. Molėtai (district centre) 3,665
Pakruojis district64. Pakruojis (district centre) 3,85265. Linkuva 1,913
Panevėžys district66. Ramygala 2,11367. Naujamiestis (urban settlement) 763
Pasvalys district68. Pasvalys (district centre) 6,02769. Joniškėlis 1,871
Plungė district70. Plungė (district centre) 13,56071. Rietavas 3,421
Prienai district
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Urban district Population72. Prienai (district centre) 7,84173. Jieznas 2,12674. Balbieriškis (urban settlement) 1,451
Radviliškis district75. Radviliškis (district centre) 16,84176. Šeduva 3,30977. Tyruliai (urban settlement) 829
Raseiniai district78. Raseiniai (district centre) 8,93179. Ariogala 2,979
Rokiškis district80. Rokiškis (district centre) 9,14681. Obeliai 2,03082. Pandėlys 1,40683. Juodupė (urban settlement) 2,290
Skuodas district84. Skuodas (district centre) 4,693
Tauragė district85. Tauragė (district centre) 19,46186. Skaudvilė 2,657
Telšiai district87. Telšiai (district centre) 20,22088. Varniai 2,027
Trakai district89. Trakai (district centre) 4,67790. Vievis 2,95791. Lentvaris 8,05992. Grigiškės (urban settlement) 4,99193. Rūdiškės (urban settlement) 2,03794. Elektrėnai (urban settlement) 6,646
Ukmergė district95. Ukmergė (district centre) 21,663
Utena district
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Urban district Population96. Utena (district centre) 13,319
Šakiai district97. Šakiai (district centre) 4,22798. Kudirkos Naumiestis 2,43799. Gelgaudiškis (urban settlement) 1,835
Švenčionys district100. Švenčionys (district centre) 4,616101. Pabradė 5,919102. Švenčionėliai 5,964
Šilalė district103. Šilalė (district centre) 2,975
Šilutė district104. Šilutė (district centre) 12,401105. Pagėgiai 3,332106. Rusnė 2,599107. Žemaičių Naumiestis (urban settlement) 1,807108. Panemunė (urban settlement) 492
Širvintos district109. Širvintos (district centre) 3,073
Šiauliai district110. Kuršėnai 11,468
Eišiškės district111. Eišiškės (district centre) 3,477112. Šalčininkai 1,753113. Baltoji Vokė (urban settlement) 1066
Jurbarkas district114. Jurbarkas (district centre) 6,575115. Smalininkai 953Urban population, total 1,571,737Source: The All-Union Census of Population of the USSR for 1970,available from Demoscope Weekly athttp://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr70_reg2.php (accessed 22 May2013). The total given here falls short of the 1,628,000 total given by TsSU(1972, p. 594) as Lithuania’s urban population in 1970 by approximately
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56,000. The gap is most likely accounted for by armed forces personnel,prisoners, or both.
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Table A-8. Kompromat and persons compromised: Panevėžys, 1972 All Refusedtravel In post Cleared RefusedclearancePersons, total 176 96 79 6 10
Personal dataProb. Russian 1% 2% 0% 0% 0%Prob. Female 41% 66% 15% 17% 0%Average age 1944 20.2 24.2 15.7 10.8 10.6Average yearseducation 9.6 7.5 12.5 13.3 14.2Prob. Party orKomsomol 8% 4% 10% 67% 30%
Labour market statusProb. Employed 85% 71% 100% 100% 100%Prob. WC/Supervisor |Employed 73% 45% 97% 83% 100%Prob. Retired 11% 21% 0% 0% 0%Prob. Housewife 4% 8% 0% 0% 0%
Nature of compromising evidence (percent of persons in column)Prob. Historicalcircumstances:Personal 17% 14% 19% 17% 50%Of family member 6% 4% 9% 33% 10%Prob. Liable toresettlement:Personally 5% 7% 3% 0% 0%As family member 16% 9% 25% 17% 40%Of family members 7% 5% 9% 17% 30%Prob. Historical action:Personally 14% 14% 14% 0% 0%By family member 31% 33% 29% 50% 50%Prob. Sentenced:Personally 18% 8% 29% 0% 0%Average term, years| Sentenced 12.7 12.0 12.9 … …Family member 13% 14% 9% 17% 20%Prob. Currentcircumstances:Personally 7% 10% 3% 0% 0%Family memberabroad 28% 45% 9% 0% 20%Prob. Current action:Personal 19% 29% 4% 0% 50%By family member 2% 2% 1% 17% 10%Source: Calculated from Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/703, 90-91 (Spisok lits,dopushchennykh k sov. sekretnoi rabote i dokumentam skompromaterialami. From nachal'nik Panevezhskogo GO KGB pri Sovete
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Ministrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik S.Iu. Kishonas. Date: 3 December 1972),92-93 (Spisok s nalichiem kompromaterialov, kotorym v dopuskeotkazano, no prodolzhaiut rabotat’ na ukazannykh dolzhnostiakh. Date: 2December 1972), 94-109 (Spisok lits, otvedennykh ot poezdki za granitsuza 1970/72 goda. From nachal'nik Panevezhskogo GO KGB pri SoveteMinistrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik S.Iu. Kishonas. Date: 2 December 1972),110-122 (Spisok s nalichiem kompromaterialov na lits, zanimaiushchikhrukovodiashchie dolzhnosti. From nachal'nik Panevezhskogo GO KGB priSovete Ministrov Lit. SSR podpolkovnik S.Iu. Kishonas. Date: 3 December1972). “WC” = white collar.For further description see the text.
